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ABSTRACT
State environmental agencies face opposition when they revise or propose new
regulations. Environmental regulations are typically challenged because they impose
costs, are perceived to be unfair, or the scientific basis of the regulation carries some
degree of uncertainty. The difficulty of crafting regulations is compounded by the
existence of multiple interest groups that are affected by rules and rulemaking in different
ways. Attempts by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection to update
the state's septic code illustrate the difficulty state environmental agencies can face, even
when most interest groups agree a regulation or regulatory revision is overdue.
Recognizing the shortcomings of traditional procedures, some state agencies have tried a
negotiated approach to rulemaking, bringing together representatives of the agency and
affected interests to negotiate the content of proposed regulations. Three examples are
presented. In Texas, negotiations to develop procedures and protocols for assessing
natural resource damages from oil spills brought together representatives of three state
agencies, the oil transporting and oil producing industries, and environmental groups. In
Ohio, representatives of the state's environmental protection agency, health departments,
landfill operators, and citizen's groups negotiated new rules regulating landfilling of
construction and demolition debris. In Maine, a divisive referendum campaign left the
state transportation agency in charge of implementing a planning policy that it had
opposed. A rule implementing the new transportation planning policy was successfully
negotiated by a committee of representatives from the business community, environmental
and public interest groups, and state agencies, with the assistance of a team of neutral
facilitators.
Negotiated rulemaking, the process used in the three state examples, was developed in
response to the perceived inadequacy of traditional rulemaking procedures to address the
types of regulatory problems environmental agencies often face. While the theory of
negotiated rulemaking is based on federal experience, the three state cases demonstrate
that the process can improve regulatory outcomes at the state level, as well. State
agencies may be motivated to utilize negotiated rulemaking less frequently than their
federal counterparts, however, and a challenge will be to ensure that agencies know about
the procedure for those instances when traditional procedures fall short.
Thesis supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Studies and Environmental Planning
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NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING:
A TOOL FOR STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES
INTRODUCTION
State environmental agencies face problems when they set standards and revise or propose
new regulations.' The challenge of environmental regulation stems from the complexity of
the issues involved and the number and range of stakeholders typically affected by
regulatory decisions. Conventional rulemaking procedures are frequently adversarial and
do not provide agencies the means for dealing effectively with the inherent complexity and
uncertainty of environmental issues in order to produce regulations diverse interests
groups can accept. Unhappy stakeholders challenge the rules in court or, more frequently
at the state level, appeal to the legislature or executive branch to intervene.2 This thesis
considers the characteristic problems in environmental regulatory disputes and reviews
some examples of state experience with an alternative approach, negotiated rulemaking.
The first chapter reviews the factors that frequently make environmental regulations
controversial. I argue that environmental regulations are vulnerable to challenge because
they impose costs, which raises the question of whether the costs are justified by the
1 See, e.g., Richard Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law," Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 88: 1667. 1975; Philip J. Harter, "Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise," Georgetown Law
Journal, Vol. 71:1, 1982; Lawrence Susskind, "Mediation and the Accountability Problem," Vermont Law
Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, Spring, 1981; Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse,
Basic Books, 1987; Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform, Harvard University Press, 1982; David
M. Pritzker (ACUS) and Deborah S. Dalton (EPA), Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, Office of the
Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office, September
1995.
Although the focus of this paper is on state level regulation, I draw extensively on the theory and practice
of administrative law and environmental regulation that has been written in reference to federal law and
federal agencies. Some state laws will vary, certainly, and state and federal agency experience is unlikely
to be exactly comparable. However, all states have state-level counterparts of the Environmental
Protection Agency, (Lee M. Thomas "The Successful Use of Regulatory Negotiations by EPA,"
Administrative Law News, Fall 1987), and my assumption has been that state agencies face enough of the
same demands and challenges that the references apply. The examples presented here bear out that
assumption.
2 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1995; p. 369.
environmental benefits; because they are perceived as unfair, since the burdens and
benefits of the regulation are distributed unevenly or have uneven impacts, depending on
the capacities of regulated entities to absorb the imposed costs, and because affected
interests may feel they have no say in important decisions affecting them. Because the
complexity and uncertainty of the scientific and technical bases of the regulations are
difficult to convey and prove, environmental regulations are vulnerable to challenge by
those who question the need for the regulations, and their likely effectiveness, on scientific
grounds. Complicating the regulator's task is the fact that environmental regulations
typically affect a wide range of interest groups that have different perspectives and
priorities. Finally, the traditional rulemaking process, which is frequently adversarial, falls
short of dealing effectively with these difficulties to produce a rule viewed as legitimate by
a cross-section of affected interests.
The second chapter looks at a rulemaking endeavor that used the traditional "notice and
comment" rulemaking process. The rule in question is very complex, affects a wide range
of interest groups, and the process was very contentious. It is presented here to illustrate
the points made in Chapter 1 and to establish that the difficulties inherent in environmental
regulation are likely to resist easy solutions.
Negotiated rulemaking has been proposed as an alternative to traditional rulemaking and is
designed to more effectively address the interests of diverse stakeholders to produce a
better rule in a less adversarial forum. Chapter three presents summaries and analyses of
three examples of state-level negotiated rulemaking, also called regulatory negotiation or
reg-neg. The examples presented here met what I consider to be minimum criteria to
qualify as negotiated rulemaking: a neutral was engaged to facilitate the talks, and
representatives of key stakeholders, including the agency responsible for writing the rule,
participated in developing the regulations. In addition, the negotiated rule had to have
been promulgated, so that the response (if any) of affected interests not directly
participating in the talks could be assessed.
I present here the first three examples I found that met the above criteria. Two were
identified through correspondence and phone calls to dispute resolution offices (one in
Texas and one in Ohio) and the third I read about in an article in the newsletter
Consensus. The summaries are based on the limited amount of written material that was
available and telephone interviews with some of the participants. What I found was
successful rulemaking endeavors that were not necessarily spectacular, that had problems,
that did not, perhaps, fulfill all the promise of innovation and the discovery of
opportunities for mutual gain that an "ideal" reg-neg might have. Yet all three faced the
tenacious and thorny problems outlined in the first chapter, and all three were successful in
that they produced rules that all parties could agree to--an accomplishment that had
seemed doubtful at the outset. The examples show that negotiated rulemaking does
provide a forum to bring different stakeholders together that is less adversarial than the
traditional regulatory model. The assistance of a skilled, neutral facilitator can help to
establish and maintain a problem-solving focus for the group.
The fourth chapter covers the theory of negotiated rulemaking, including the conditions
that help to ensure success, and provides an overview of federal experience with the
process.
In the last chapter, I consider the merits of negotiated rulemaking for state agencies, and
conclude that this process can be a valuable tool for state environmental agencies when
used in appropriate circumstances.
1. THE CHALLENGE OF WRITING
THE RULES: POINTS OF CONTENTION
The substance of proposed environmental regulations as well as the procedures by which
they are produced can generate or magnify opposition. This section reviews five factors
that are central to the problems administrative agencies face in drafting environmental
regulations. First, environmental regulations impose costs, and those who are asked to
bear the costs may object, and question whether the costs are justified.' Second, a
regulation may be challenged on the basis of fairness, because costs and benefits are
distributed unevenly -- or have unequal impacts.2 Third, the scientific basis of a rule may
be challenged, because regulatory decisions often must be made despite some degree of
scientific or technical uncertainty.3 Fourth, environmental regulations typically affect a
wide range of interests, making the agency's task of reconciling differences to produce a
workable regulation more difficult. At a minimum, an agency is likely to hear from some
who want greater flexibility and fewer environmental restrictions, others who want more
and stronger environmental protections, and perhaps local governments resisting new
responsibilities or other regulatory impacts, as well. Each interest group will attempt to
make its case the most convincing to the agency.4 Fifth, the conventional rulemaking
process can magnify opposition and hinder efforts to develop effective and fair
regulations. Traditional "notice and comment" rulemaking procedures, combined with the
potential for court challenges after a rule is adopted, are typically adversarial, and
encourage parties to take extreme positions (to establish a record that may be useful later
in court, for example, or as a starting point from which to negotiate toward a
Lawrence Susskind, Lawrence Bacow, and Michael Wheeler, Resolving Environmental Regulatory
Disputes, 1983, p. 1.
2 Susskind, et al. (1983) Ibid.
3 Milton Russell and Michael Gruber, "Risk Assessment in Environmental Policy-Making," Science, Vol.
236, 17 April 1987, pp. 289-290; Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1993; p. 49.
4 Lee Thomas, "The Successful Use of Regulatory Negotiations by EPA, Administrative Law News, Vol.
13, No. 1, Fall 1987; Lawrence Susskind, "Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem,"
Vermont Law Review, Vol.6, No. 1, Spring 1981; Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
compromise). An adversarial rulemaking process can undermine the perceived legitimacy
of the final rule, thus reducing voluntary compliance and the rule's effectiveness, and
contributing to its instability.'
COSTS
Environmental regulations impose costs--on regulated industries, businesses and
individuals, and on municipal and county governments expected to implement and enforce
regulations promulgated at the state or national level. Critics have charged that the costs
of environmental regulation result in lost jobs and economic stagnation, and have
portrayed environmental quality goals as a luxury that some segments of society can ill
afford.6 Local governments have sided with industries in objecting to costly regulations.
Concern about the costs of environmental regulations at the federal level emerged not long
after the first major environmental laws were passed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and
are reflected in a series of executive orders requiring agencies to weigh the costs and
benefits of proposed regulations, and authorizing regulatory oversight by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB).8 Some environmental statutes specify the degree to
which the implementing agency should consider costs in meeting statutory goals, as well.
For example, Rodgers observes that legislators may require regulations to be cost-
oblivious (in exceptional cases), cost-effective, cost-sensitive, or able to meet a cost-
benefit test.9
5 Thomas 0. McGarity, "Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Process," Duke Law Journal,
Vol. 41, No. 6, June 1992; Richard B. Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law,"
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 8.; Philip J. Harter, Op. Cit., "Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for
Malaise," 71 Georgetown Law Journal 1, 1982.
6 See, e.g., Lester C. Thurow, "Environmental Problems," The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the
Possibilities of Economic Change, 1980, pp. 103-12 1; Bob Benenson, "A Mature 'Green' America
Spawns...Grass-Roots Anti-Regulatory Rebellion," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 53, No.
24, June 17, 1995, p. 1694.
7 Tom Arrandale, "A Guide to the Environmental Mandate Maze," Governing, Vol. 8, No. 5, February
1995, p. 49.
8 Richard A. Liroff, "Federal Experience: Cost-Benefit Analysis in Federal Environmental Programs," in
Swartzman, Liroff, and Croke, eds., Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Regulations: Politics,
Ethics and Methods, 1982, pp. 38-40 (Nixon, Ford, Carter); Vice President Al Gore, Creating A
Government that Works Better and Costs Less: Improving Regulatory Systems, Accompanying Report of
the National Performance Review, p. 10 and p. 78 (Reagon, Bush, Clinton).
9 William H. Rodgers, Jr. "Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental
Decisionmaking," Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1980, pp. 201-214.
While the idea that agencies should weigh the costs and benefits of environmental
regulations and ensure that costs are justified has obvious appeal, the appropriate means of
verifying or agreeing that the proper balance has been struck is much less obvious. Cost-
benefit analysis is regularly championed by some as a way to ensure that adequate
attention is paid to the economic implications of regulatory decisions. However, others
see severe practical limits to using the process, and question its legitimacy on a number of
grounds. Moreover, some suspect that some of the advocacy of cost-benefit analysis is
driven more by "a desire to subvert the nation's commitment to environmental goals" than
a desire to improve the cost-effectiveness of regulations.' Because cost-benefit analysis is
frequently advocated by those who question the worth of environmental regulations as a
means to verify or establish some "objective" measure of costs and benefits (and by
implication the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the regulation), a review of some of the
problems associated with cost-benefit analysis follows.
Swartzman identifies methodological, political, and ethical sources of controversy in cost-
benefit analysis." Problems with methodology involve the problem of comparing
incommensurables. They include the technical challenge of pricing things not normally
traded on markets, the different outcomes that can result depending on what assumptions
are made by the analyst (assumptions that should be, but may not be, made explicit to
decision makers using the cost-benefit analysis), and the level of uncertainty associated
with different steps along the way.12 Time is a critical, and complicating, factor, as well;
both present and future implications and consequences need to be considered. Short term
costs may be required to produce long term benefits. Small changes in the discount rate
used to calculate future costs and benefits can produce large differences in results."
Contingent valuation techniques that attempt to determine a price in the absence of
10 Liroff, Op. Cit. p. 35.
" Daniel Swartzman, "Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Regulation: Sources of Controversy," in
Swartzman, Liroff and Croke, Op. Cit. p. 58.
2 A. Myric Freeman, cited in Liroff Op. Cit. p. 45; see also Steven Kelman, "Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Environmental, Safety, and Health Regulations: Ethical and Philosophical Considerations," in
Swartzman, Liroff, and Croke, Op. Cit. p.143.
" Liroff, Op. Cit. p. 44.
markets by, for example, asking people how much they would be willing to pay for some
environmental improvement or how much they would be willing to accept for some
environmental degradation, can produced variable and debatable results.1 4
The policy question is how the cost-benefit analysis is to be used: will the analysis produce
a bottom-line decision rule whereby a proposed regulation or standard is approved or
rejected? Or will the analysis be used as one source of information, a factor among others
for the decision maker to consider? It is apparent that some advocates of cost benefit
analysis believe that cost-benefit analysis is an appropriate way to make political decisions
and that the cost-benefit balance should be the deciding factor.15 Others point out that
government has other concerns that supersede economic efficiency, such as equity.16
Given methodological problems and the range of outcomes that might be predicted for a
given proposal, as well as value judgments implicit in the way we view democratic
decision making processes (discussed below), skeptics and critics of cost-benefit analysis
argue against placing undue weight on forecasts of costs and benefits to decide policy.
Cost-benefit analysis raises important ethical questions. The roots of economists'
enthusiasm for economic efficiency (and its logical extension in regulatory matters, cost-
benefit analysis) are in the utilitarian branch of moral philosophy, which holds that an
action is moral if benefits of the action are greater than costs, and not moral if costs are
greater than benefits.1 7 But, as Kelman argues, utility alone is insufficient as a moral
philosophy, because it ignores commonly accepted moral rights and duties, which have
"prima facie moral validity." 18
14 Eric L. Hyman, "The Valuation of Extramarket Benefits and Costs in Environmental Impact
Assessment," Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1981, pp. 227-264.
" Stewart, Op. Cit. p. 1702 ("economic analysis has frequently been advocated as a source of substantive
rules for determining administrative policy").
16 George P. Schulz, "The Abrasive Interface," in Business and Public Policy, John T. Dunlop, editor,
(Graduate School of Business Administration Harvard University), 1980, p. 18; McGarity, Op. Cit,
pp.1391-1392 (lists fairness, allocative efficiency, and factual accuracy as some of the societal goals with
which public agencies are concerned).
1 Kelman, Op. Cit. pp. 138-140.
18 Kelman, Op. Cit. p. 142; Kelman cites duties not to lie and not to kill, and notions about human rights
as examples.
Some critics of cost-benefit analysis argue that the equation of public, political decisions
with a summing up of individual consumer preferences errors by failing to distinguish
between "how people value things in private individual transactions and how they would
wish a social valuation of those same things made in public decisions."' 9 Such a judgment
"violates a view of citizen behavior that is deeply [ilngrained in our democratic tradition
[and] denudes politics of any independent role in society...."20 Another ethical concern is
that the very act of pricing something that does not ordinarily have a price--from a human
life to a spectacular scenic vista--may have the effect of lowering the perceived value of
the thing. It diminishes the thing's intrinsic value to its instrumental value, and has the
opposite effect of, for example, asserting that something is "not for sale," which "signals
and affirms a thing's distinctive value to others..."21
The common economic practice of applying a discount rate to calculate future costs and
benefits has important ethical implications regarding intergenerational equity. For
example, a committee of the National Research Council reporting on the regulation of
chemicals found "that if a discount rate of 5 percent were used, one case of poisoning by
chemicals today would be valued the same as 1,730 cases occurring in 200 years, and over
3 billion cases 450 years hence. The committee concluded that 'intergenerational effects
of these magnitudes are ethically unacceptable, yet they might be made to appear
acceptable if the traditional social rate of discount concept were applied.'" 2 2 Using
"willingness to pay" as criterion will "bias the analysis against the poor and against future
generations."23
The litany of difficulties and uncertainties and the long-running debate over the use and
misuse of cost-benefit analysis suggests the trouble agencies may encounter over the cost
of regulations and in their attempts to ensure that the benefits of proposed regulations
19 Kelman, Op. Cit. p. 145. See also, Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth, Cambridge University
Press, 1988.2 0 Kelman, Op. Cit. p. 146.
21 Kelman, Op. Cit. p. 147.
22 Liroff, Op. Cit. p. 44; internal quote is from National Academy of Sciences, "Decision Making for
Regulation Chemicals in the Environment," (1975).
23 Rodgers, Op. Cit. p. 196.
justify costs. Whatever the method of calculation, the government's estimate of costs and
benefits is likely to be disputed--and possibly by more than one side in the debate.
"[E]nvironmentalists and developers agree that government regulatory agencies figure
costs and benefits incorrectly."2 4 Furthermore, complaints about the cost of environmental
regulations may have more political salience today than ever before, as regulations
increasingly address more diffuse sources of pollution and increasingly impact small
businesses and individuals."
FAIRNESS
Because environmental regulations entail choices about the distribution of costs and
benefits, 26 and those costs and benefits have uneven impacts, regulations may be opposed
on the grounds that they are unfair.2" The perceived fairness of a regulation influences its
perceived legitimacy,28 which in turn can affect the rule's effectiveness (through higher or
lower rates of voluntary compliance, for example) and stability.29
The notions of fairness and justice are closely related. "Justice" pertains to "general
principles for the distribution of resources and obligations in society as a whole," whereas
the concept of "fairness" applies to particular cases and contexts and "includes views on
how to apply any broader principle of justice regarded as pertinent to a specific context."30
Requirements that administrative agencies apply rules consistently are related to the ideal
of formal justice, which holds that "government interference with important private
interests be permitted in accordance with rules known in advance and impartially
applied."31
1 Susskind (1981) Op. Cit. p.11.
2 Benenson, Op. Cit. p. 1695.
26 Susskind (1981) Op. Cit. pp. 13, 17.
27 Susskind et al. (1983) p. 1.
28 Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse. Basic Books, 1987, pp. 24-25; also
see Cecilia Albin, "The Role of Fairness in Negotiation," Negotiation Journal, July 1993, p. 240 (links
perceptions of fairness and legitimacy in negotiated outcomes).
29 See, e.g., Harter, Op. Cit., p. 22; Albin, Op. Cit. p. 225; and Fisher and Ury, p. 156.
30 Albin, Op. Cit. p. 225.
31 Stewart, Op. Cit. p. 1698.
However, environmental regulations inevitably have unequal impacts, even if uniform rules
or standards are applied evenly. 2 "[T]he fact that no two communities or companies have
the same resources to draw upon creates unfair situations in practice."" The distribution
of costs and benefits of environmental regulations reflect value-laden decisions about
which different interest groups may disagree,3 4 so that considering the issue of fairness
raises the question, "fair to whom?"3 Different interests, values, time horizons,
perceptions of risk, and other factors can influence perceptions of what is fair.
Given the absence of a single, ascertainable "public interest" in many regulatory matters,
courts and the legislature have turned to expanding interest participation as a way to
increase the fairness and legitimacy of regulations.36 However, providing equal
opportunity to participate requires more than extending the right to participate to
increasing categories of affected interests. Effective participation requires resources--to
conduct research, compile supporting documentation, and bring in experts to testify, for
example. Powerful, well organized interests are better able to do all these things that less
organized and less well-off interests." Some observers therefore question the
effectiveness of expanding participation rights as a means to increase the fairness of
regulatory processes.
Furthermore, the expansion of participation rights has made rulemaking procedures more
formal and more adversarial, which can undermine the perceived legitimacy of the
outcome in the view of those who believe their interests were not sufficiently considered.
32 Susskind et al. (1983) Op. Cit. p. 1; Breyer (1982) Op. Cit. p. 115; also see Yeager, The limits of law:
public regulation ofprivate pollution, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 285 (smaller firms may be
less able to absorb costs of compliance than larger, wealthier firms and therefore be cited for frequently for
pollution violations; Yeager proposed that factors such as this and others bias regulations in favor of
larger companies.
3 Susskind et al. (1983) Op. Cit. p. 1.
3 See, e.g., Susskind (1981) Op. Cit p. 13.
" Albin, Op. Cit. p. 225.
36 Stewart, Op. Cit. p. 1683; p. 176 1 ("[It is claimed that interest group participation] ...increases
confidence in the fairness of government decisions.... [Proposals for expansion of participation rights]
follow logically from the premise that justice results when all interests are considered.")
3 Breyer (1982) Op. Cit. p. 352.
38 Breyer (1982) Op. Cit. p. 354; Harter, Op. Cit., p. 22.
Another, somewhat contradictory concern comes from evidence suggesting that, in some
cases, newly participating interests perceive outcomes and processes as fairer, even though
outcomes remain substantially unchanged. This has led some observers to worry that
increasing participation rights can serve to manipulate and co-opt affected interests
without improving regulatory decisions. Susskind and Cruikshank argue that in judging
fairness, both the process and the outcome need to be considered, and that fairness needs
to be judged by the community at large as well as the participants.3 9 The wide reach, long
term consequences, and irreversibility of resource allocation decisions means that future
generations and affected but unorganized interests also need to be considered in judging
the fairness of an outcome.4 0
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY
Science and technology play a key role in the assessment of risks and the management of
risks to public health and the environment, two functions at the core of environmental
regulation.41 Sound science is considered key to legitimate environmental regulation--not
only to achieve regulatory goals, but also to withstand challenges from those who oppose
the regulation.42 However, the processes of risk and environmental impact assessment and
management are complex, the data ambiguous and replete with uncertainty, and assessors
and managers are required to make subjective judgments throughout the process. These
factors can lead to disagreement among experts about the characterization of
environmental risks and the appropriate responses,43 and provide the basis for opponents
of the selected management option to challenge the agency's decision.
39 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit. pp. 24-25; also Susskind (1981) Op. Cit. p. 17.
* Susskind (1981) Op. Cit. pp. 7, 8, 16.
4 John D. Graham, "Science and Environmental Regulation," in Harnessing Science for Environmental
Regulation. John D. Graham, editor. NewYork: Praeger Publishers, 1991, p. 1; also, Russell and Gruber,
Op. Cit., pp.286-288.
42Graham, Ibid. p.1.
43See, e.g., Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, "Problems and Procedures in the Regulation of
Technological Risk," in Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe Enough. Richard C. Schwing and
Walter A. Albers, Jr., editors. New York: Plenum Press; Richard Wilson and E.A. C. Crouch, "Risk
Assessment and Comparisons: An Introduction," Science, Vol. 236, 17 April 1987; Dale Hattis and David
Kennedy, "Assessing Risks from Health Hazards: An Imperfect Science," Technology Review, May/June
1986.
Risk assessment
The purpose of a risk assessment is to inform regulators' understanding of what the risks
are and how big they are.4 Simply by initiating a particular assessment the agency makes
several important value judgments that are relevant to the outcome of the process. When
an agency determines that a potential risk is worth looking into (a significant judgment),
the boundaries of the problem or potential risk to be assessed are defined and an
assessment team is selected and assigned to the task. The way in which the problem is
bounded and defined will influence the selection of the assessment team, the team's
understanding of its mission, and, ultimately, the results of the assessment.4 ' Risk
assessments often require interdisciplinary teams of scientists and engineers,46 and whether
and how experts on an interdisciplinary team interact can also influence the direction and
evolution of the assessment.47
The complexity of the assessment itself provides multiple avenues for the introduction of
uncertainties and the incorporation of simplifying assumptions and subjective judgments.
For example, assessing the health risk posed by a chemical pollutant involves determining
dose-response relationships and estimates of human exposure. The exposure assessment
needs to consider multiple pathways (for example, inhalation, ingestion and skin
absorption), and the probable duration and intensity of the exposure.48 The assessment
must determine the environmental distribution and fate of the pollutant in and across
different media.4 9 The different physical states a chemical may exist in must be taken into
account in calculating dispersion.50
"Wilson and Crouch, Op. Cit. p. 267.
45Lawrence E. Susskind and Louise Dunlap, "The Importance of Nonobjective Judgments in
Environmental Impact Assessments," Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1981.
*"Paul J. Lioy, "Assessing total human exposure to contaminants," Environmental Science and
Technology, Vol. 24, No. 7, 1990.
47 Susskind and Dunlap, Op. Cit.
4 Jeffrey B. Stevens and Deborah L. Swackhamer, "Environmental pollution: A multimedia approach to
modeling human exposure," Environmental Science and Technology, Vol. 23, No. 10, 1989.
49 Stevens and Swackhamer, Op. Cit.; Hattis and Kennedy, Op. Cit. p.63.
so Stevens and Swackhamer, Op. Cit. p. 1181.
Data may be missing, flawed or only marginally appropriate. In general, data are drawn
from historical sources (and used in epidemiological studies) or animal tests.
Epidemiological studies are suited to relatively few types of cases" and the use of data
from animal tests entails comparing effects in animals to humans and extrapolating from
large doses to small, steps requiring the application of controversial theories.s2 To make
predictions based on either historical data or laboratory tests requires use of models," and
different models can produce vastly different results.54 In addition, the data base required
for the selected model may contain significant gaps or be of questionable quality,
specificity, and/or applicability." Because generating new data entails considerable time
and expense and may not be an option, analysts frequently must make assumptions and
judgments where gaps exist or the precision or applicability of data is questionable. As
risks are estimated, estimates of uncertainty are applied to the estimates about risks."
The final product of the assessment, a risk characterization, is used by risk managers to
develop, consider and select from a range of management options." Subjective judgments
and assumptions are a necessary part of a process that aspires to (but can never fully
achieve) an ideal of "scientific objectivity." To aid those who must evaluate the results of
the assessment, assumptions and value judgments should be made as explicit as possible.
As this outline of the process suggests, risk assessment is an uncertain science that, despite
the assessors' conscientious adherence to scientific and analytic principles, entails
decisions and judgments about which qualified, disinterested scientists may disagree.
Similarly, the consequences of land use decisions and the assessment of environmental
' Hattis and Kennedy, Op. Cit. pp. 63-64.52 Wilson and Crouch, Op. Cit. p. 268.
53 Wilson and Crouch, Op. Cit. p. 268.
54 Hattis and Kennedy, Op. Cit. p. 65. According to Hattis and Kennedy, analysts in different fields prefer
different models; they provide the example that molecular biologists favor "multistage" models, while
pharmacologists and toxicologists favor "probit" models. Hattis and Kennedy also cite a study comparing
a number of different models that showed that, depending on the model used, the risk of cancer from a
particular substance differed by a factor of one million.
" Stevens and Swackhamer, Op. Cit.
56 Wilson and Crouch, Op. Cit. p. 267.
" Paul F. Deisler, Jr., "The risk management-risk assessment interface," Environmental Science and
Technology, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1988.
impacts of proposed development projects can be just as uncertain and subject to debate. 8
Risk management
Risk management, the process of controlling and minimizing risks, is certainly no more
straightforward. Risk assessments inform regulators in setting priorities, designing
regulations, and formulating technological requirements." To set priorities, risks are
compared and ranked.60 To do this, the risk manager must take into account not only the
characterization of risk determined by the assessment, but also ethical, social, and political
factors; public and individual perceptions of risks and benefits; technical factors and
feasibility; economic costs and benefits; legislative and legal constraints; and the concerns
of public, business, labor, and other interest groups.' As with risk assessments, value
judgments and assumptions are incorporated in the decision making process, and
predictions about the effectiveness and suitability of management solutions necessarily
carry some degree of uncertainty.
Regulatory agencies must act despite scientific uncertainty, however.62 Scientists by
training prefer to reserve commitment to a hypotheses until it is proven, 63 and rightly so.
But the responsibilities of public agencies with mandates to protect public health and the
environment are different from those of a research scientist. 4 Failure to act to minimize
or mitigate an identified risk--waiting until every scientific uncertainty has been banished,
for example--is after all a type of action, and has consequences. "We can never do
58 See, e.g., Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit.; Susskind and Dunlap, Op. Cit.; and Susskind (1981) Op.
Cit.
59 Russell and Gruber, Op. Cit.
6 Wilson and Crouch, Op. Cit. p. 269.
61 Deisler, Op. Cit. (list of factors from Figures 1 and 20) pp. 17-18.
6 2 David L. Bazelon, "Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View," Harvard Environmental Law Review,
Vol. 5:209; Lawrence Susskind and Gerald McMahon, "The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking," Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 3:133, 1985 ("Agencies ... must ... make policy choices in
situations where either the desired facts are not available or the available "facts" are contested.") p. 135.
63 Graham, Op. Cit. p. 1; Bazelon, Op. Cit. p. 213. Graham observes that "[a]s long as the burden of
proving risk to human health lies with the regulator, any imperfections in scientific knowledge about
human risk can operate to permit continued human exposures to toxic chemicals."
" Bazelon, Op. Cit. pp. 212-213.
nothing. [T]he status quo is action...."65 Agencies cannot do everything, 66 of course, and
not responding to an identified environmental risk may be the appropriate decision. Such
a decision needs to be evaluated and weighed with other options. Whatever the agency's
course of action, the absence of certainty about the feasibility and effectiveness of
proposed management solutions can fuel public doubts, if not outright opposition and
resistance, and lead to charges that the agency is doing too much, or too little, and often
enough, both. 7
MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS
As the preceding sections suggest, environmental regulations affect many different groups
and individuals. Interested parties include the agency; other agencies directly involved or
interested in the resolution of the issue; regulated businesses, industries, and governmental
agencies; public interest and environmental groups; citizens interested in a site specific
action or decision; the agency's counterpart agencies in other jurisdictions and levels of
government; and citizens at large.68 Legislators and the executive branch are likely to be
interested as well, if their constituents are. Consumers and utility rate payers, 69 diffuse and
unorganized interests who may be unaware of the regulatory proceedings,70 and future
generations all may be affected by environmental regulatory decisions. 1
Different parties have different stakes in the outcome. A regulated industry and its
neighbors may have more obvious stakes in siting and permitting requirements than others
65 Garret Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science, Vol. 162, 13 December 1968, pp. 1243-1248;
also, see Stewart, Op. Cit. p. 1756 (The "non-assertion of governmental authority may itself be a decision
among competing interests"); and Bazelon, Op. Cit. p. 213. ("[I]t would be ironic if agencies had to show
that a scientific consensus existed before they could act against suspected health and safety hazards.")
"Russell and Gruber, Op. Cit. p. 286.
6 7 Russell and Gruber, Op. Cit. pp. 289-290; Breyer (1993) Op. Cit. ("The very fact that the many
assumptions required by uncertainties are not clearly derivable from science can make them a lightning
rod for contending political forces.") p. 49.
* Thomas, Op. Cit.
69 Breyer, (1982) Op. Cit. (on hearings of the Federal Power Commission on gas prices, "both sides had
legitimate claim to representing the consumer--one stressing lower prices and the other stressing need to
avert a shortage") p. 352.
70 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit. p. 102.
71 Susskind (1981) Op. Cit. p. 8.
who nevertheless have equally legitimate interests in the outcome, for example. Also,
broadly defined interest groups such as developers and environmentalists contain
subgroups and factions, including pragmatists and hardliners, whose views may vary from
the group as a whole.7 ' And, as noted, different interests have different perspectives and
values, different methods of calculating costs, risks and benefits, and different levels of
technical knowledge, advocacy skills, and resources.73
The expansion of participation rights in administrative decision making procedures has
transformed the agency's role from decision making expert to a kind of "umpire"
balancing competing interests,74 although agency expertise in both administrative and
substantive matters remains important, as well." Susskind and Cruikshank observe that
"the agency's problem, typically, is that any given standard will please some groups and
offend others, and the available scientific data...rarely offer a definitive basis by which to
justify the choice of one standard over another."76 Moreover, each side "suspect[s] that
regulatory agencies are more sympathetic to the other side."77
PROBLEMS WITH THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
Most federal agencies promulgate regulations according to "informal" rulemaking
procedures of the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA), enacted in 1946.
Although some variations inevitably occur in rulemaking procedures at the state level,
states too have enacted administrative procedures laws. Informal procedures under the
APA are outlined here to provide an overview of the requirements that govern agency
rulemaking generally.
7 Susskind (1981) Op. Cit. p. 10.
7 Breyer (1982) Op. Cit. pp. 352-353.
74 Harter, Op. Cit., p. 14; Stewart, Op. Cit. p. 1683.
71 Breyer (1993) Op. Cit. p. 62.
76 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit. p. 36.
" Susskind (1981) Op. Cit. p. 12.
78 Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking, 2nd
Edition, Office of the Chairman, 1991 (by Benjamin W. Mintz and Nancy F. Miller), p. 3 and p. 47.
"Formal" APA procedures are rarely used, and only in very limited types of cases.
The evolution of informal rulemaking
Typically, when developing or revising a rule, an agency generates a draft of the proposed
rule and publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register (or, for state
agencies, the analogous state publication). The notice includes a description of subjects
and issues involved in the proposed rule, the authority under which the rule is proposed,
and the time, location and nature of public proceedings.79 A comment period follows the
announcement, providing the public the opportunity to contribute to the rulemaking
record by submitting written information and arguments and, theoretically, helping shape
the final rule. 0 Public hearings also may be conducted during this time, but are not
required under APA provisions. The APA directs the agency to consider "all relevant
matter presented" and include a "concise general statement of [the rule's] basis and
purpose" in the final rule.81 The final rule is published in the Federal Register.8 2 If the
rule is controversial, however, opponents are likely to seek judicial review at this point to
stop the rule altogether or, at a minimum, to delay implementation.83
This once straightforward process, which was intended to shorten the rulemaking process
and enhance agency flexibility, has become increasingly complex and formal over the
years.84 In the early 1970s, new programs, especially in the areas of health, safety, and the
environment, delegated broad discretionary authority to agencies. 85 At the same time,
however, there was concern about agency discretionary power and the potential misuse of
this delegated authority. Subsequently, new laws, executive orders and judicial decisions
have added new procedural and substantive requirements to administrative rulemaking.86
795 U.S.C., S. 553(b) (1988 ed.), reprinted in ACUS, Federal Agency Rulemaking, Op.Cit.; p. 376.
8o Susskind and McMahon, Op. Cit.
s U.S.C., S. 553(c), in ACUS, Federal Agency Rulemaking, Op.Cit.; p. 376.
5 U.S.C., S.552(aXl)(D); publication requirement applies to "substantive rules of general applicability,"
in ACUS, Federal Agency Rulemaking, Op. Cit., p. 273.
13 The APA provides that the reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set aside...agency actions, findings
and conclusions found to be...arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law," among other reasons. (5 U.S.C., S. 706(2)(A), in ACUS, Federal Agency Rulemaking, Op.Cit.,
p. 385)
* McGarity, Op. Cit, p. 1385; Stewart, Op. Cit. p. 1752.
s Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Risk and the Environment: Improving
Regulatory Decision Making; New York, June 1993, p. 107; Harter, Op. Cit., p. 10.
S6 Harter, Op. Cit., pp. 10-13.
To ensure that all pertinent facts and interests are adequately and fairly considered, courts
have expanded substantive, factual requirements; directed agencies to consider all affected
interests; and widened the scope of interests with legal standing to participate in and
challenge regulatory decisions. 7 As the technical complexity of new areas being regulated
88 Athra
exceeded agency expertise, and the range of diverse interests affected by the new
regulations expanded, rulemaking became a largely political process of balancing
competing claims and interests.89 Yet despite the broadening of requirements, "notice and
comment" rulemaking has not achieved the promise of interest participation some had
hoped for it. It has made the process more formal and more adversarial, without
necessarily improving regulatory decisions. Critics charge that in general little changes
between proposed and final rules.90
Problems with the adversarial nature of interest participation
Interest representation in typical rulemaking procedures is adversarial, with each party
striving to persuade the agency of the merits of its position and pointing out the flaws in
opposing positions.9' The adversarial process encourages agencies and private parties to
take extreme positions, anticipating that they will need to move toward the center as a
compromise.92 Similarly, the process encourages parties to take strong positions even on
issues that are relatively unimportant to them, to have issues to concede in a compromise.
This makes it difficult for the agency and other parties to identify what really matters to
each party, in order to make "informed trade-offs." 93 Sturm, discussing public law
remedies, points out that the traditional adversarial approach to dispute resolution, well-
suited for determining liability, does not serve well when the challenge is to find
7 Harter , Op. Cit. pp. 10-12; Stewart, Op. Cit. pp. 1670, 1679, 1712, 1716, 1728.
8 McGarity, Op. Cit. p. 1398; Harter, Op. Cit. p. 17.
89 Stewart, Op. Cit pp.16 8 3 -16 8 6 ; Stephen Breyer (1993) Op. Cit. p. 57.
" Stewart, Op. Cit. p. 1775 ("Public interest advocates have tended to scorn resort to rulemaking
proceedings on the ground that participation in such proceedings may have little impact on agency policy
determinations.")
9 1Harter, Op. Cit. p. 18.
92 Harter, Op. Cit. p. 19.
9 Harter, Op. Cit. p. 19-20;
practicable options that diverse affected parties are willing and able to comply with.9 4 This
is the challenge environmental regulatory agencies face, as well.
Because the process can end up in court, agencies and private parties are impelled to
develop vast amounts of material to establish a record and buttress their positions. Such
effort in "defensive research" consumes time and material resources of all parties, and
frequently is only of marginal value to the ultimate decision or rule. 95 The process
encourages participants to exploit scientific uncertainty,9 6 and contributes to the distortion
of scientific and technological information. Each side focuses on evidence that supports
its position and ignores contradictory evidence, as well as the uncertainties and qualifying
elements associated with the data.97 No forum is provided to resolve disagreement over
scientific and technological issues. Parties do not directly interact, limiting the opportunity
for an exchange of important information as well as discussion of possible trade-offs
between competing interests.9 8 Instead, each directs its argument to the agency,
converting the agency, as noted earlier, "from an expert guardian of the public interest to a
form of 'umpire,' albeit an active one."99
The adversarial nature of the traditional rulemaking process also undermines the perceived
legitimacy of the outcome and may reduce voluntary compliance with the regulation. 00
Lack of perceived legitimacy also undermines the stability of the regulation, as those who
perceive themselves to be the "losers" of the contest await the opportunity to have the
94 Susan P. Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies," The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol.
79, No. 5, June 1991, pp. 1358-1365.
95 Harter, Op. Cit. p. 21; Stewart, Op. Cit. p. 1773.
96 Breyer (1993) Op. Cit. p. 49.
97 Harter, Op. Cit. p.21; Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., p. 29. (Describes the hiring of experts to
exploit uncertainties and "undercut each other's claims" as the "dismal process of "advocacy science.");
also see Bazelon, Op. Cit., p. 213. (Calls on agencies to disclose uncertainty, noting, however, that
"[t]hose who must make practical decisions [despite uncertainty]... may be tempted to disregard or even
suppress any lack of confidence they may have.")
98 Harter, Op. Cit. p. 20; Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit. p. 71.
" Harter, Op. Cit. P. 14. (Citing Williams' use of 'umpire' in "Fifty Years of the Law of Federal
Administrative Agencies--and Beyond," 19 Fed.B.J.267,268 (1970).)
100 Harter, Op. Cit. p. 22.
regulation changed or overturned.' 0' Likewise, if the debate is decided (for a time) by the
courts on procedural grounds, the substantive conflicts will remain unresolved, casting
doubt on both the legitimacy and stability of the outcome.
Finally, the traditional rulemaking process has evolved into such an arduous and expensive
process that breeds so much conflict, agencies are loathe to revisit issues even in light of
new information or changed circumstances.102 That is not stability, however, it is
ossification;' 3 it raises the stakes in each rulemaking procedure, and contributes to the
erosion of agency credibility and public's confidence in regulatory decision making.
The next chapter reviews a recent rulemaking effort by the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP). DEP followed traditional notice and comment
procedures to revise the state environmental code regulating on site sewage treatment
systems, and was challenged on many of the points raised here.
'
0 1Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit. pp. 39-41.
10 2 McGarity, Op. Cit. p. 1436.
1 03 McGarity, Op. Cit. p. 1385. McGarity attributes use of the term in reference to rulemaking to E.
Donald Elliott, former General Counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency.
2. THE TITLE 5 REVISIONS
The experience of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in
revising Title 5 of the state environmental code, which regulates septic systems and
cesspools, illustrates the problems described in the first chapter. The process of revising
the code started before 1991 and may be complete in 1996. DEP followed the usual steps
in the regulatory process, first identifying failing septic systems and the inadequacy of the
existing code as a problem, hiring a technical consultant to study the issue, drafting
revisions to the code, and presenting them to the public for comment. The technical
evaluation was completed in 1991,' and by the end of the next year the department had a
draft proposal ready. Sensitive to the fact that the proposed revisions were significant, the
department took some extra steps and scheduled preliminary information meetings around
the state in November and December 1992, to explain the changes and solicit input on
several outstanding issues, before finalizing its proposal.2 Public reaction was
pronounced, ranging from some support to a good deal more apprehension and anger.3
Repeated revisions followed that initial round of meetings over the next three years,
during which time the governor and state legislature also became involved.
THE PROBLEM
Broadly defined, the problem facing DEP was the pollution of the state's groundwater and
surface water from nonpoint (diffuse) pollution sources. In revising Title 5, DEP focused
on the problem of pollution from on-site sewage disposal systems (septic systems and
cesspools). More than a quarter of the households in the state use on-site sewage disposal
systems, and the existing code had not been updated since 1978.4 In the meantime,
'DeFeo Wait and Associates, Inc., for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection, Technical Evaluation of Title 5: The State Environmental Code 310 CMR
15.00, March 1991.
2 Richard Kindleberger, "Sewage plan will face fight," The Boston Globe, December 26, 1992, p. 28.
' Kindleberger, Ibid.; Department of Environmental Protection, "Response to comments received
following the Title 5 Public Information Meetings," February 1993.
4 DeFeo, Wait & Associates, Op. Cit., p. v.
scientific understanding of the impacts of subsurface sewage disposal on groundwater and
surface water had advanced, suggesting to the department that provisions in the existing
code were not sufficient to protect public health and the environment. Furthermore, DEP
estimated that half of all on-site systems did not even meet existing standards.' The 1978
code had no enforcement provisions, and all but the most blatant failures might go
undetected.
Concerns about shortcomings of the existing code were supported by surveys of the
state's coastal and inland waters, which indicated that more than half failed to meet federal
standards for fishing and swimming, due mostly to nonpoint pollution.6 DEP ranked
pollution from failing septic systems and cesspools as one of the top four contributors of
surface water pollution.7 In coastal waters, shellfish bed closures more than doubled
between 1980 and 1990, due to bacterial pollution. On Cape Cod, the number of acres of
shellfish beds closed due to pollution jumped from 700 acres to approximately 7,000 acres
during the same period, and then recovered--some 2,000 acres reopened by 1993--as a
result of efforts in some Cape towns to more aggressively monitor septic systems and
require that failing systems be replaced.8
KEYSTAKEHOLDERS
As with most environmental issues, the revisions of Title 5 affected many interest groups.
None of the groups was monolithic, each had subgroups whose priorities varied to some
degree. Key stakeholders and their interests included the following:
DEP technical staff and legal staff, at regional offices and in Boston, and
commissioner. DEP's interests included achieving better protection of groundwater and
s DeFeo, Wait & Associates, Ibid., p. v; DEP, "Response to comments following the Title 5 public
information meetings, February 1993; and DEP, "Response to comments following the Title 5 public
information meetings, 15 June, 1993.
6 Diane Dumanoski, "60% of waters in Mass. still polluted," The Boston Globe, Metro Section, June 13,
1993, p. 17.
7 DEP, "Executive Summary: Proposed Revisions to Title 5," undated; circa Fall 1993.
8 Dumanoski, Op. Cit.
surface water resources by revising on-site sewage disposal standards and incorporating a
means to encourage and achieve compliance. The department had a political interest in
achieving these goals with a minimum of acrimony and conflict. In addition, DEP sought
to postpone changes to the code that would open to development some areas that had
long been assumed to be off limits because of the existing code, until communities had
time to prepare for such changes. The department therefore intended to postpone changes
in soil evaluation methods recommended in the consultant's technical evaluation, and the
routine approval of any alternative treatment technologies, pending a statewide growth
management initiative planned by the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs.9
9 Local boards of health. Health officials are responsible at the local level for
administering Title 5.'o At first, some were specifically concerned about being saddled
with a new, potentially overwhelming, burden of conducting regular septic system
inspections, as proposed in DEP's initial draft." That requirement was eventually
dropped, 2 although local health officials remained interested and retained responsibility
for local administration of Title 5. Their priorities and interests were varied. Some were
interested in increasing the flexibility and discretion they could exercise at the local level;' 3
some expressed concern about the economic impacts the code might have on their
neighbors and their community; 4 some were concerned about the position they would be
placed in, including vulnerability to lawsuits, for enforcing the proposed stricter
9 Kindleberger, Op. Cit.; DEP, "Summary of key policy issues in the revision of Title 5," 11/17/92.
10 DEP, "Questions and answers to proposed revisions to Title 5," June 15, 1993.
" Letter from Gregory Erickson, Director of Public Health, Town of Wilmington, to Brian Donahoe,
Director, DEP Division of Water Pollution Control, December 21, 1992.
" DEP, "Summary & Comparison of Major Revisions to Proposed Clean Water Rules (Title 5), Spring
1994," indicates that the "current draft...requires inspections only at time of property transfer, change of
use, or expansion."
" Erickson, letter, Op. Cit., and pers. com., April 17, 1996;
" Everett Penney, Andover health agent, quoted in "D-Day is night for impact of septic rules: complying
with Title 5 expected to be expensive for homeowners," by Andy Dabilis, The Boston Globe, Northwest
Weekly section, March 26, 1995, p. 1; letter from John P. Gusha, Chairman, Holden Board of Health to
Brian Donahoe, (urged DEP to coordinate with other state agencies and work with communities and
individuals that do not have sufficient resources to implement the new measures on their own), November
11, 1993.
standards; some were interested in tightening existing standards, which they considered
inadequate from a public health standpoint;'6 and some believed it was important for
municipalities to retain the option to pass stricter standards.1 7
0 Home owners with on-site sewage disposal systems. Home owners with septic
systems or cesspools had an obvious interest in being able to meet new standards,
preferably with a minimum of disruption. The cost of upgrading a system, or even paying
for an inspection, was a great concern for some." Others were concerned that they simply
would be unable to meet new requirements at any cost, due, for example, to lot size or
slope, or soil or hydrologic conditions." Home owners also were concerned that the new
code would interfere with their ability to sell their property. 20 To the extent that new
regulations drove up the costs of home ownership, by requiring more expensive
technologies or larger land areas, for example, present and future home owners generally,
and lower income home owners in particular, had an interest. To the extent that the
revised code had a positive impact on water quality and environmental quality, the code's
influence on future water supply costs, property values, and quality of life generally also
was of interest, especially to future home owners and residents.
* Realtors. Because new requirements would be factored into housing costs and
potentially impact the real estate market, realtors had an interest in containing costs of any
new proposals. Realtors' stakes in the debate escalated sharply in 1994, when DEP
revised its initial proposal by replacing the requirement for regularly scheduled inspections
15 Everett Penney, Ibid., (some departments are referring homeowners to private inspectors for fear of
liability); Erickson letter, Op. Cit., (proposed inspection program "would create tremendous 'ill will'
between the community and the Board of Health").
16 Louise B. Kress, member of Boxford Board of Health, prepared Testimony for Department of
Environmental Protection on Proposed Revision to Title V, June 1, 1994; Gusha letter, Op. Cit.; Andy
Dabilis, Op. Cit.
" Letter from Marcia Benes, Executive Director, The Massachusetts Association of Health Boards, Inc.,
Plainville, MA, to Leo Roy, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, June 19, 1994; letter from Fran
Sculley, Town of Rowley Board of Health re DEP hearing on Title V revision, September 29, 1995.
' DEP, "Response to comments received (15 June 1993) Op. Cit.
19 Laura Pappano, "State weighs new rules on septic woes," Boston Globe, West Weekly section,
November 21, 1993.
20 Mary Sit, "Sewage disposal showdown," Boston Globe, Real Estate section, February 26, 1995.
with a requirement that systems be inspected at the time property was sold or the title
transferred. That stipulation added uncertainty as well as monetary costs to property
transfers, and was strenuously opposed by real estate interests.
e Developers. Developers were interested in minimizing any new constraints on
development and hoped to remove some existing constraints. Thus, they opposed DEP's
proposal to increase setbacks from waterways, wetlands, and wells, for example, and other
land area or technological requirements that would increase development costs.
Developers sought the identification and approval of alternative treatment technologies
that could allow building in areas where traditional septic systems were unsuitable and
could provide adequate sewage treatment at lower costs than traditional systems in other
areas. They argued that the agency was ignoring scientific advances that had been made in
alternative treatment systems. Developers objected strenuously to DEP's intention to
postpone changes in soil evaluation methodology that would likely have opened some
areas to development. They also wanted the code to be considered a "standard code" that
applied equally throughout the state and eliminated the option for communities to enact
stricter requirements.
e Environmentalists. Environmentalists were concerned about the adverse impacts of
failing septic systems on the environment and supported DEP's efforts to strengthen Title
5.2 They supported proposed new setbacks from water resources, but were concerned
that proposals for nutrient loading were not sufficient to protect environmentally sensitive
21 Mary Sit (Feb. 26, 1995), Ibid.; Robert Daylor, Daylor Consulting Group (representing NAIOP on Title
5 advisory committee), pers. com., and Dabilis, Op.Cit.
2 Kindleberger, Op. Cit., December 26, 1992; letter from Christine Braley, Home Builders Association of
Massachusetts, Inc., to Brian Donahue, DEP, November 30, 1993; letter from John S. Marini, President,
Home Builders Association of Massachusetts, to the Honorable Argeo Paul Cellucci, Office of the Lt.
Governor, May 27, 1994; letter from Guy A. Webb, Development Director, Builders Association of
Central Massachusetts, Inc., to Senator Matthew J. Amorello, July 14, 1994; letter from William Habib,
Director of Government Affairs, Homebuilders Association of Massachusetts, Inc., to author, May 9,
1996; David Chandler, "State unveils more flexible rules to stop septic pollution," Boston Globe, Metro,
September 9, 1994.
23 Letter from Alexandra Dawson, Massachusetts Association of Conservation Commissioners, to author,
April 16, 1996; Jeff McLaughlin, "Consensus is sought on septic rules," Boston Globe, Metro, June 5,
1994.
areas.2 4 Although they had concerns about the land use implications of some of the
proposed changes, some environmentalists saw Title 5 as an inappropriate growth
management tool, and urged the state to assist and encourage communities to "enact more
appropriate growth control measures."25 They supported the approval of alternative
treatment technologies that offered pollution prevention benefits over traditional
systems.26 They also stressed the importance of providing financial assistance to those
unable to pay for needed upgrades.2 7 DEP was also urged to complete a "long-awaited"
septage management plan, because enforcement of the revised code would encourage
many residents to pump their systems more regularly, increasing the volume of septage
needing disposal and exacerbating the existing problem of a shortage of septic waste
facilities. 28
* Regional planning boards and county commissions. Regional planning boards
generally expressed a shared interest in DEP's goals. They were concerned, however,
about potential changes in land use and the financial impacts proposed revisions might
have on some individuals and communities. Many supported a proposed statewide
planning initiative to assist regions and municipalities in developing regional or local land
use plans, before development constraints provided by the existing Title 5 were lifted.
They also wanted the code to be flexible enough to deal with exceptional circumstances,
so that home owners would be spared unnecessary financial hardship. They were
concerned that proposed flow limits, which limited the number of bedrooms allowed per
acre, might discourage cluster zoning and hinder prospects for developing and maintaining
low and middle income housing.29 While acknowledging that concerns about the costs of
24 Letter from Joseph E. Costa, Buzzards Bay Project, to Daniel Greenbaum, DEP, November 30, 1993.
2 Letter from Louis J. Wagner, Massachusetts Audubon Society, to Brian Donahoe, DEP, November 23,
1993.
26 Letter from Alexandra Dawson, Massachusetts Association of Conservation Commissions, to Brian
Donahoe, DEP, December 16, 1992; letter from Philip B, Posner on behalf of 1000 Friends of
Massachusetts to Brian Donohoe, Division of Water Pollution Control, November 30, 1993; Wagner
letter, Ibid.
27 Wagner letter, Ibid.
28 Wagner letter, Ibid.
29 See, e.g., letter from Timothy W. Brennan, Executive Director, Pioneer Valley Planning Commission to
Brian Donahoe, November 29, 1993; letter from Margaret Striebel, Chair, and Mary Forbes, Franklin
County Commission to Secretary Trudy Coxe, November 29, 1993; and letter from Charles W. Cook,
the proposed regulations were important, one commenter noted that pollution prevention
measures, such as those contained in the proposed revisions, were cost effective in the
long run.30
* Residents in sewered areas were less directly affected, but had an interest in seeing that
efforts undertaken in their areas to upgrade sewage treatment plants and otherwise clean
up water pollution--efforts undertaken at considerable costs that were producing results--
not be undone by pollution emanating from improperly maintained and inadequately
monitored on-site systems.
* Governor. Like the agency, the governor had a political interest in resolving the
conflict over Title 5 as quickly and amicably as possible. Whereas the agency had the
governor and legislators to be thinking about (in addition to more directly affected
stakeholders), the governor had legislators threatening to block implementation as well as
his supporters and the voters of the state in general to consider.3 ' After the revisions
finally took effect in spring 1995, and higher than expected inspection and repair costs set
off more protests (louder than ever), the governor attempted to quell the uproar by
convening a commission of primarily business interests to recommend changes.33
Interim Administrator, Berkshire County Regional Planning Commission to DEP Division of Water
Pollution Control, November 30, 1993.
3 Brennan letter, Ibid.
3' Dumanoski, Op.Cit., (scientist who worked on recent water quality survey observed that rivers have
improved substantially over past 20 years, largely due to construction of municipal sewage treatment
plants and eliminating factory discharges). The view that all regions need to contribute to cleaning up
and protecting the state's waterways was expressed in Boston Globe editorials in 1993 and 1995, "The
cost of clean water," November 5, 1993; and "Paying the water bill," March 26, 1995.
32 Frank Phillips and Peter J. Howe with Matt Carroll, "State plans effort to quite the roar over septic
rules," Boston Globe, June 8, 1995; P. Howe, J. Jacoby, S. Lehigh, B. Mohl, F. Phillips and A. Walker,
"Weld aides fret over fallout from new septic system rules," Boston Globe, June 18, 1995, p. 26.
3 Peter Howe, "Weld to ok measure on Title 5 Study Panel," Boston Globe, June 20, 1995, p. 41.
* Legislators: Legislators were hearing from anxious and unhappy homeowners and
business interests, and had an interest in protecting their constituents and in maintaining
public health and environmental protection.34
POINTS OF CONTENTION
Concerns and disagreements about the costs, fairness, and scientific justification of
proposed revisions pervaded the long-running debate over Title 5. And, as might be
expected, the resolution of these differences was complicated by the wide range of
affected interests, outlined above. The legitimacy of the final outcome was undermined by
a process that was adversarial, did not serve to effectively resolve issues and address
interests so much as it achieved "split the difference" type compromises that left no one
particularly happy, and, in turn left each revision unstable and subject to attack from one
or more disaffected interests.
Costs
Costs were widely recognized as a critical factor in code revisions. Those who generally
supported the revisions, including conservation organizations and planning commissions,
and several other state agencies that commented, were concerned about the impact on
communities and individuals, and urged DEP to develop some funding sources to assist
home owners and communities in order to make the new code work.35 Environmentalists
also were concerned that consideration of costs and affordable housing not be used by
some who opposed the new code as a strategy to derail needed improvements.36
3 4 Pappano (Nov. 21, 1993) Op.Cit.; the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture,
Legislative Report on the 1995 Revisions to Title 5: The Commonwealth's Clean Water Rules, February 6,
1996.
" Letter from Jeffrey R. Benoit, Massachusetts, Coastal Zone Management Office, to Brian Donahoe,
DEP, December 24, 1992; letter from Peter Webber, Department of Environmental Management , to
Brian Donahoe, DEP, November 30, 1993, letter from Charles W. Cook, Berkshire County Regional
Planning Commission, to Title 5 Revisions, DEP, November 30, 1993; Brennan letter, Op. Cit.; Striebel
and Forbes letter, Op. Cit..36 Dawson letter, Op. Cit.
Home owners, developers, local health officials, and realtors were particularly concerned
about costs associated with the revised code. The costs of having a system inspected was
a new, unanticipated, and considerable expense for home owners. Home owners whose
systems failed to meet new standards would face even greater costs, to upgrade." The
uncertainty of what the costs might be fueled speculation and anxiety. Home builders
were concerned about the impact the new regulations would have on the cost of new
homes. New setbacks and other areal requirements, for example, could decrease
allowable housing densities, driving up costs and depressing demand. Planning
commissions and other commenters also were concerned about the impact of such changes
on the availability of affordable housing. DEP initially proposed that local health officials
administer a regular inspection and maintenance program, suggesting that inspections be
conducted at least every three years. In response to objections that such a program would
impose a huge burden on health departments and suggestions from a number of sectors
that time of title transfer would be a more workable trigger for inspections, DEP proposed
that inspections instead be required whenever property changed hands. Needless to say,
the real estate industry argued that inspections at the time property was sold added
unacceptable costs to real estate transactions. One developer went so far so to argue that
the proposed revisions threatened to kill economic recovery in the state."
Others noted that preventing pollution by such measures as DEP proposed was cost
effective over time, and that the revisions served to protect future homeowners. The
agency was challenged to find a balance between both long term, future benefits, and short
term, present costs, as it worked on various revisions. 9
37 DEP, "Response to comments (February, 1993), Op. Cit. ("[E]xpense to the homeowner and the
resources necessary to implement an [inspection and maintenance] program at the local level were two
issues identified 75% of commenters as of the most concern.")
38 Letter from Garen M. Bresnick, Home Builders Association of Massachusetts, to Brian Donohoe, DEP
December 24, 1992, p. 14. ("The real question which we are asking is whether E.O.E.A. and D.E.P.
ascribe to the Governor's desire to facilitate economic recovery in Massachusetts or whether they are on a
lark of their own to shut down any prospects of economic recovery.")
39 Brennan letter, Op. Cit.
The question of how the costs of the revised code were distributed, and whether costly
changes were scientifically justified and would produce tangible benefits, were also hotly
contested. These questions, relating to fairness and scientific uncertainty, are discussed
below.
Fairness
The fairness of the revisions was also challenged. Different stakeholders protested the
impact of the revisions on their constituency, suggesting that they were being required to
bear a disproportionate and unfair share of the costs.
Health officials objected to being handed the responsibility of ensuring compliance by
conducting regular inspections, a job some estimated would be impossible to complete,
considering limited staff and resources, even if they did nothing else.40 Real estate
interests protested when the requirement for inspections was then shifted to take effect
when a house was sold or changed hands. They considered this an impediment to housing
sales, and a dubious means to identify failing systems, since only home owners whose
houses were on the market (or who were otherwise transferring title) were required to
have their systems inspected.41 Nevertheless, the requirement for systems to be inspected
when property changed hands withstood challenges and was part of the rules that took
effect on March 31, 1995. By August 1995, DEP had authorized an option for
communities to establish and seek approval for a regular inspection program. Home
owners in communities with an approved program would not be required to have their
systems inspected when property was sold.42
40 Erickson letter, Op. Cit.; Usha Lee McFarling, "A cesspool, septic compromise," Boston Globe, April
24, 1994.
41 Pappano (Nov. 21, 1993), Op.Cit.
42 Letter to Marilyn Contreas, Senior Analyst, Executive Office of Communities and Development, from
Dean Spencer, Acting Director, Division of Water Pollution Control, Re: Notice of proposed regulatory
revisions - Title 5 of the State Environmental Code, 310 CMR 15.00; August 24, 1995.
Home owners were obviously concerned about their share of the cost of the new
regulations.43 Arguably, it is fair to expect home owners not to have polluting systems,
and to expect them to pay for upgrading systems if necessary to ensure that their waste
does not become a cost for their neighbors or the public at large." But, in practical terms,
application of the rules is not so straightforward. Since different people have different
resources and different capacities to absorb the new costs contained in the code, it
automatically had differential impacts as it was applied.4 5 Media coverage of hardships
imposed by the new code emphasized this aspect of the issue.4 6 In addition, people who
had diligently maintained their systems, paying regularly to have them pumped out to keep
them functioning, felt that instituting an inspection program on top of their regular
maintenance was unjustified.47 Homeowners with cesspools challenged DEP's proposal
that all cesspools be considered failing systems that would have to be replaced. Cesspools
were already considered substandard under the 1978 code, but remained in use and
evidence indicated they were a major source of pollution. Despite evidence of the general
inadequacy of cesspools as disposal systems, however, individuals with functioning
cesspools that were not polluting could argue that the proposed revision was unfair as it
applied in their case. 48 Eventually DEP moved on this requirement so that cesspools did
not fail "by definition" when the rules were finally promulgated.
Home builders challenged what they termed "selective implementation" of the technical
report that provided the basis for many of DEP's proposed revisions.49 DEP explicitly
stated that it would not adopt the soil evaluation method recommended in the report, and
would instead, for a time, keep the soil percolation rate standard that was in the existing
code. DEP had stated from the beginning that the basis for keeping the old standard in
4 See, e.g., McFarling, Op. Cit.
"Matt Carroll, "Tinkering with Title 5," Boston Globe, June 11, 1995 (quotes resident saying she did not
want to be penalized for her neighbor's pollution).
4 See, e.g., letter from Karen S. Fung to Division of Water Pollution Control, November 24, 1993.
* E.g., Mary Sit, "Fallout from septic failures," Boston Globe, Real Estate, May 7, 1995.
47 Letter from George R. Northrup, Sunderland, MA, to John Vivieros, DEP Water Pollution Control Div.,
Jan. 25, 1995.
48 See, e.g., letter from Kenneth R. Ramsay to Director, Division of Water Pollution Control, October 27,
1993; letter from Roland Foley to Brain Donahoe, DEP, November 24, 1993.49 Kindleberger, Op. Cit.
this case mostly had to do with land use planning concerns rather than soil science. The
department believed it would be irresponsible not to allow communities the time to make
changes in land use zoning codes, if necessary, before the department made changes that
would remove development constraints that had long existed. The department also
pointed out that the new soil evaluation method recommended in the report was more
complex than the existing percolation rate test, and that soil evaluators would need to be
trained before the new method could safely be implemented.5 0 Developers, however,
believed the department was unfairly refusing to remove old restrictions found no longer
to be warranted on scientific grounds, while introducing new restrictions based on new
scientific understanding."' As noted in the first chapter, agencies have many factors to
consider in developing rules, but developers attempted to frame the discussion on soil
evaluation as a choice between rationally based decision making on one hand (which
would remove previously existing constraints on development in some areas) and
arbitrary, and thus unjust, consideration of other factors, on the other hand.
Another question was how changes would affect lot owners' future construction plans and
investment expectations. Was it fair to prohibit a construction plan that had received local
permit approvals and that was allowable under the 1978 code but was not permitted under
the proposed code? In environmentally sensitive areas, some lots considered buildable
under the old code might be completely unbuildable under the new code. DEP at first
proposed that the new guidelines apply to existing lots, but over time this changed so that
plans approved under the 1978 code would be allowed to go forward. 2
Yet another issue considered unfair by some was DEP's original system design
assumptions for all new houses. DEP recognized that homeowners frequently added
bedrooms onto their homes without increasing the capacity of the septic system, and that
this was a significant cause of septic system failure in the state. To address this problem,
50 DEP, "Response to comments (15 June 1993) Op. Cit.
5' Letter from David Begelfer, Davis, Malm & D'Agostine, representing the NAIOP (the Association for
Commercial Real Estate), to Daniel Greenbaum, Commissioner, DEP, December 23, 1992.
52 DEP, "Executive Summary" (circa Fall, 1993), Op. Cit.
DEP proposed that any new house should have a system that could accommodate a four
bedroom house, even if the house was actually smaller. 3 Obviously people with smaller
families who wanted a smaller house could consider this requirement unfair because they
would be required to pay for extra capacity that they did not need.
Scientific uncertainty
Disagreement over the scientific and technical bases of the revised code emerged before
the technical report commissioned by DEP was finished. The foreword of the report notes
that comments submitted by members of a DEP advisory committee reflected a wide range
of concerns. "Given the diversity of interests represented by the advisory committee," the
forward notes, " it is extremely doubtful that unanimity among reviewers could ever be
achieved."5 4 The report does not reveal the specific areas of disagreement that emerged,
but presumably they were among the scientific and technical issues questioned and debated
subsequent to the report's completion and each round of proposed revisions that followed.
As noted previously, the department was also criticized for taking into consideration
factors other than science and technology, as it did for its proposals on soil evaluation
methods and the use of alternative treatment technologies. Some of the disputed issues
are outlined below.
DEP was challenged on a number of common assumptions it made in proposing a nitrogen
loading limit (later generalized to a nutrient loading limit). The expected nitrogen load
was assumed to be correlated to wastewater flow, and the expected flow was assumed to
be correlated to the number of bedrooms in the house. Developers and realtors
questioned the assumption that the size of a household could be estimated from the
number of bedrooms in the house. They also questioned the need for DEP's proposed
flow limits.55 Environmentalists doubted that the proposed flow limits would be sufficient
" The flow through a system was estimated based on the number of people assumed to be living in a
house, which was estimated based on the number of bedrooms. The assumptions underlying this method
of estimating a household's septic system usage also were challenged.
54 DeFeo Wait & Associates, March 1991, Op. Cit., p. ii.
" Jeff McLaughlin, Op. Cit. (Quotes Rep. and realtor Teague, "we insist you distinguish between matters
of opinion and matters of science.")
to protect some particularly sensitive areas such as coastal embayments and areas already
damaged by excess nitrogen.16
The scientific validity of deep observation hole tests to determine groundwater level was
contested. DEP proposed adding methods used by the U.S. Geological Survey to the
measures required to establish groundwater levels, while leaving some methods previously
used in the state, notably deep observation hole tests, to the discretion of local authorities.
A developers' association questioned the usefulness of deep observation hole tests,
charging that communities require them only to delay and thwart construction." An
association of conservation commissions argued that the deep hole tests were still
needed.5
Different sides challenged or commended the department's specifications for calculating
the effective leaching area of a particular type of septic system.5 9
DEP offered both scientific and administrative grounds for increasing setback distances
from wetlands--to provide additional environmental protection and to attain consistency
with the state's wetlands regulations. Developers challenged the department's reasoning
and early in the review process the department conceded the point, emphasizing
administrative reasons for the concession. 0
The capacity of a statewide code to provide adequate protection for all areas was also
debated. Some environmentalists and public health officials objected to DEP's proposal
that the revised code be considered a statewide standard, which would make it difficult or
impossible for local boards of health to adopt more conservative standards believed
56 McLaughlin, Ibid.; letter from Joseph E. Costa, Buzzards Bay Project, to Daniel Greenbaum, DEP,
November 3, 1993.
s' Bresnick letter, Op. Cit., p. 13.
8 Dawson letter, Op. Cit.
'9 Bresnick letter, Op. Cit.; letter from Charles H. Dauchy, an environmental consultant, to Brian
Donahoe, DEP, December 22, 1992 (described leaching pits, the system at issue, as "cannons pointed at
the groundwater").
60 DEP, "Response to comments (15 June 1993), Op. Cit.
necessary due to local conditions." Developers and real estate interests sought to
establish a statewide code that allowed no (or very few) options for what they viewed as
arbitrary local standards.62
Developers contended that DEP failed to demonstrate that its proposed changes would
produce a "finite or quantifiable improvement" of either groundwater quality or the life
span of the septic system, although its proposals would require more land and drive up the
cost of home ownership.63
The process
DEP determined that Title 5 needed to be updated and commissioned a technical
evaluation of the code. The study covered site evaluation, system design, and locational
standards, and included information on regulatory practices in other states. An advisory
committee of representatives of different interest groups reviewed and commented on
drafts of the report, which was completed in March 1991. The report authors noted that
they were unable to reconcile the wide range of viewpoints that were expressed on some
issues. 5
The agency's presented its proposed Title 5 revisions to the public in seven public
meetings held around the state in November and December 1992. The purpose of the
meetings was both to present and explain the proposed revisions and to solicit comment
on several issues that had not been resolved. The department proposed increased setbacks
from water resources, a locally administered inspection and maintenance program, and
tighter siting and technological standards, among other changes, and requested input on
nutrient loading standards and the kinds of environmentally sensitive areas that should
trigger more restrictive standards. DEP stated that it would postpone changing soil
61 Costa letter, Op. Cit.; Benes letter, Op. Cit.; Sculley letter, Op. Cit.
62 Bresnick letter, Op. Cit.
63 Bresnick letter, Ibid., p. 10.
" DeFeo, Wait & Associates, Op. Cit.
65 DeFeo, Wait & Associates, Ibid., p. ii.
percolation rate standards or making any across-the-board approvals of alternative
treatment technologies until a pending statewide growth planning initiative was
undertaken. The agency expected the proposed rules to be published within a couple
months.66
More than 650 people attended the meetings, and the concern expressed at the meetings
and in subsequent comment letters and phone calls apparently convinced the agency to
make more extensive changes than it had initially foreseen. After nearly a year, in October
1993, the department held hearings around the state to present its revised proposal.67
Most of the hearings drew approximately 150 people, but one meeting in central
Massachusetts had to be rescheduled when more than 1,000 people showed up. In
response to continued opposition to the proposed changes, DEP convened an advisory
committee that included representatives from health boards, the development community,
real estate interests, and environmental groups, to work on new revisions. 8
The following April the advisory committee reached agreement members said they could
live with,6 9 and a "tamer reaction" was reported to another round of hearings. Some
groups clearly remained unhappy with the proposals; in May developers represented on
the committee appealed to the Lieutenant Governor that the agency was ignoring
important concerns and announced they were withdrawing their support. The acting DEP
commissioner refuted the charges and suggested the real difficulty may have arisen from a
splinter group within the organization. More hearings were held around the state in late
spring, and the new regulations were promulgated in September 1994. Several
* Kindleberger, Op. Cit.
67 DEP, "Executive Summary" (circa Fall, 1993), Op. Cit.
68 Pappano (Nov. 21, 1993) Op. Cit. Attendance figures from letter from John P. Gusha, Chairman of the
Holden Board of Health, Op. Cit.6 9 McFarling, Op. Cit.
70 Pappano, "A tamer reaction for septic rules," Boston Globe, West Weekly, June 5, 1994.
71 Letter from John S. Marini, President, Home Builders Association of Massachusetts, Inc., to Lt.
Governor Argeo Paul Cellucci, May 27, 1994; and memorandum from DEP Acting Commissioner
Thomas B. Powers to Lieutenant Governor Paul Cellucci Re: Title 5 Revisions/ Homebuilder's
Association letter, June 3, 1994.
72 David Chandler, Op. Cit.; DEP, "Summary of Major Revisions to Clean Water Rules (Title 5),
September, 1994;" Letter to Massachusetts Office of the Secretary of State, Re: Revisions to Title 5 of the
"clarifications and corrections" to the new code were announced in December 1994, 7
along with a final round of hearings scheduled for January and a public comment period
that closed in February, 1995." The adjusted new code took effect on March 31, 1995.
Protests heated up notably after implementation, as the rate of systems failing inspections
under the new code turned out to be higher than expected. Inspection and repair costs
were reported to be higher than expected, as well. The major newspaper carried regular
reports of stunned and angry homeowners. Realtors blamed a slump in the spring selling
season on the new code. State legislators signaled their concern as several members
drafted bills to change or suspend the new code.75 At the same time, environmentalists
and health agents maintained that the revisions were necessary. In June 1995 the
Lieutenant Governor announced some minor alterations to the code and later that month
the Governor signed legislation to set up a commission of predominantly business interests
to look into the issue. In August "emergency regulations" designed to soften the impact
of the new code were announced. 7 Although protests continued at considerable volume,
no more changes were made and the August revisions were incorporated into Title 5 in
November 1995.78 Sentiments on the other side of the debate are reflected in a September
letter from a local health agent who urged the department to stick with what it had, that
State Environmental Code, 310 CMR 15.000 from Thomas Powers, Acting Commissioner, DEP,
September 2, 1994; "New Clean Water Rules (Title 5) Summary of Major Provisions, 310 CMR 15.000"
(undated, circa 9/23/94), provided by DEP.
73 "Public Notice" ("[DEP] gives notice of its intent to revise Title 5 of the State Environmental Code, 310
CMR 15.000, as promulgated on September 23, 1994, (the "new Code")....") Undated; circa December
1994.
74"Public Notice," Ibid.
" Mary Sit (May 7, 1995) Op. Cit.; Matt Carroll, "Towns without sewers," Boston Globe, Real Estate,
May 28, 1995; Matt Carroll, "Yearly cost of septic law seen at $20M," Boston Globe, Business, June 1,
1996.
76 Peter J. Howe, "Sides still far apart on septic system rules," Boston Globe, June 9, 1995; "Weld to ok
measure on Title 5 Study Panel," Boston Globe, June 20, 1995.
77 Doris Sue Wong, "Revisions to Title 5 unveiled," Boston Globe, August 2, 1995.
78 Doris Sue Wong, "State Retreats on Septic Systems," Boston Globe, August 3, 1995; Tina Cassidy,
"Homeowners, brokers say Title 5 Needs Changes--Fast," Boston Globe, September 21, 1995; Letter to
Marilyn Contreas, Executive Office of Communities and Development from Dean Spencer, DEP, Re:
Notice of proposed regulatory revisions - Title 5 of the State Environmental Code, 310 CMR 15.000,
August 24, 1995, Op. Cit.; "Revisions: 310 CMR 15.000, Effective November 3, 1995," handout showing
changes to text, provided by DEP.
the constant changes were making people more frustrated than ever. 9 In February 1996
the Joint Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives and Senate released a report recommending ways to "minimize hardships
associated with Title 5 and facilitate implementation of the septic system inspection
requirement."8 0
DISCUSSION
DEP's experience in revising Title 5 exemplifies the problems state environmental agencies
can have making rules. The revisions were contested because of costs, because the
distribution of costs and benefits of the new requirements were perceived to be unfair, and
because of the inherent scientific uncertainty of both the diagnosis of the problem and the
probable effectiveness of proposed solutions. The difficulty of addressing these issues was
compounded by the wide range of interests affected by the rule. The traditional
rulemaking process did not serve the agency well in addressing and reconciling these
issues.
There is no question that the agency took on an extremely complex and inherently difficult
task in revising the statewide septic code, which is perhaps why the code had not been
updated sooner. (Many, including some who objected to specifics proposed by the
department, acknowledged that revisions were overdue.) DEP was embroiled in the
contentious revision effort for several years despite adding extra steps to the traditional
notice and comment process. It started the process thoughtfully by commissioning a
comprehensive technical evaluation of the existing environmental code. The agency put
additional effort into public outreach, to explain the changes and the need for them at
public meetings around the state and in published "responses to comments" and other fact
sheets. The agency sought input from a range of interests on the advisory committee that
* Letter from Fran Sculley, Chairperson of the Town of Rowley Board of Health, to DEP hearing on Title
V revisions, September 29, 1995.
go Cover letter to Dear Colleague from Barabara E. Gray, House Chair, The Joint Committee on Natural
Resources and Agriculture, and accompanying Legislative Report on the 1995 Revisions to Title 5: The
Commonwealth's Clean Water Rules, February 6, 1996.
reviewed drafts of the technical report and later from the advisory committee convened in
response to the protests that surfaced in late 1993.
The traditional rulemaking process, even with add-ons, did not serve the department well
to anticipate serious concerns of different stakeholders and develop acceptable responses
to those concerns. As soon as the department proposed the revisions, the objective of
some stakeholders was to convince the department to change them, whatever that took.
Some submitted comments to the department and spoke up in public meetings, and some
took their objections to the media, the legislature, and the governor. With its proposal
under attack, the department, one can reasonably imagine, was put on the defensive.
As "umpire," DEP attempted to respond to some concerns and ended up alienating and
infuriating other interests. The principal example of this was shifting inspection
requirements from a regular program conducted by the local health department to
inspections required whenever the property title changed hands. By convening the
advisory committee, DEP sought input from key stakeholders. However, the department
was not represented as one of the stakeholders, and so all arguments continued to be
directed at the department. Had the department participated as one of the stakeholders,
the group's focus may have been allowed to shift toward attacking the problem --as it
affected all interests including the department--rather than the department. Not all
members of the committee were on the attack, but DEP was the target of input.
Judging from comments and the uproar following implementation, the advisory committee
did not comprise a sufficiently broad spectrum of affected interest groups. Some
commenters expressed doubts about the advisory committee's balance, saying that it was
dominated by interests who had a financial stake in defeating the new rules.81 Comment
from regional staff indicated they felt valuable technical information from regional staff
Si Letter from Marcia Benes, Massachusetts Association of Health Boards, Inc., to Leo Roy, Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs, June 19, 1994.
was being lost in the department's balancing (or refereeing) act.2 And the committee did
not anticipate the response from homeowners after the rules took effect.83 Homeowners
as a group are unorganized, and finding appropriate representatives to participate on an
advisory committee or otherwise provide input to a department would be a challenge.
Likewise, if some representative homeowners were to be identified and brought to the
table, the difficulty of their reporting back to a wide ranging and diffuse constituency
would remain. Nevertheless, a more comprehensive scoping process to find broad
regional and interest representation on the committee would have helped the department
better anticipate stakeholder's concerns.
The biggest loser in this process may be the perceived legitimacy of the code. The
department's credibility also may have been diminished by ongoing criticism by the real
estate industry and others, and the success of the protesters in getting the proposed code
revisions changed. Some homeowners made costly repairs based on requirements that
were later rescinded. It is doubtful that they, or anyone who read about their experiences,
will be as likely to cooperate the next time a revision or new regulation is promulgated.
Those who supported and understood the reasons for the changes were frustrated by
backtracking and the agency's lack of response to the criticism.
The next chapter presents summaries of three other rulemaking endeavors by state
agencies. The topics are varied and probably none was as complex as the Title 5
revisions, with its many stakeholders. However, the course taken by these agencies
illustrate a hopeful, but infrequently used, alternative to the combativeness that often
characterizes traditional rulemaking.
82 Memo from Bob Kimball [DEP Central Regional Office] through James Fuller to Beth Nicklas, June 9,
1994, Title 5 - Regional comments on proposed revisions.
83 Lois Bruinooge, personal communication, October 26, 1995. Bruinooge, then on the staff of the
Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management, had been attending meetings at the time rules were
promulgated.
3. NEGOTIATING THE RULES: THREE EXAMPLES
INTRODUCTION
As the previous chapter illustrates, state agencies must deal with complex and contentious
issues when they write or revise regulations. And, as noted previously, the "notice and
comment" rulemaking process has not proven to be well suited for dealing with the
uncertainties, complexities and wide range of viewpoints and affected interests that typify
environmental issues. Recognizing the shortcomings of the traditional rulemaking
process, some federal and state agencies have tried a negotiated approach.
This chapter summarizes three state rulemaking efforts, from Texas, Ohio, and Maine. In
Texas, negotiations to decide the procedures and protocols for assessing natural resource
damages from oil spills brought together state natural resource agencies, oil industry
representatives, and conservation groups. In Ohio, regulations for construction and
demolition debris landfills were negotiated by the state environmental protection agency,
large and small landfill operators, health departments, and citizen's groups. And in Maine,
a new approach to transportation planning was adopted by the Maine Department of
Transportation, as a result of regulations negotiated between the agency and a range of
business and environmental and public interest groups. In each case, the rule in question
threatened to be particularly contentious or already had proven to be. In each case, an
effort was made to bring key stakeholders to the table, including the agency in charge of
writing the regulation, to negotiate the content of the regulation. A neutral party was
engaged to mediate each set of talks. Despite skepticism on the part of some participants,
a few snags in procedures, and some deviations from generally recommended procedures
for negotiated rulemaking, each group fashioned a set of rules that all participants
accepted, that elicited only minor comments when the rules were proposed for public
comment, and that were promulgated without incident.
States exercise the capacity to innovate
A combination of factors motivated the agencies to try negotiated rulemaking: being faced
with a particularly difficult issue for which traditional rulemaking seemed inadequate;
having access to advice and information on the use of negotiated rulemaking; and the
openness of key agency personnel to try a new approach. None of the three states
discussed here have negotiated rulemaking statutes on their books. Rather, the legal
authority to use the procedure already existed, because the negotiations supplemented
rather than replaced traditional notice and comment procedures.' Nevertheless, a
negotiated rulemaking law has been enacted at the federal level, and some states have also
adopted negotiated rulemaking laws. Such laws mostly serve to encourage agencies to
use the procedure and provide guidance, rather than legal authority, which agencies
generally already have.2
TEXAS: OIL SPILL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES AND
PROTOCOLS
In 1993, the Texas state legislature directed the Texas General Land Office (GLO), in
conjunction with the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC), and
the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD), to adopt "administrative procedures
and protocols" for the assessment of damages to natural resources resulting from oil spills.
The directive was part of the 1993 amendments to the state's Oil Spill Prevention and
Response Act (OSPRA). The amendments direct the agencies to adopt the damage
assessment procedural rules using "negotiated rulemaking with the ... other interested
parties." 3
1 ACUS, Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, p. 69.
2 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, Op. Cit. p. 67; state Senator David Landis of Nebraska, testifying
in support of his bill, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, acknowledged that agencies in his state already had
the authority to use negotiated rulemaking, and that the proposed law was intended to "show an agency
head a process that has worked...." (Committee Statement, LB 1043 (Landis) Adopt the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act, Hearing before the Committee on Government, Military, and Veterans Affairs, February
2, 1994, p. 10.)
3 Conference Committee Report, S.B. 1049, 05/27/93, p. 13.
The background leading to the OSPRA amendments, the context of the problem the
agencies were attempting to address in adopting the procedural rules, the key stakeholders
and their interests, and the process used to develop the rules, are described and analyzed
below.
Background
In 1990, the United States Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)4 in
response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound. The act establishes the
liability of the owner or operator of a vessel or facility discharging oil for the cost of
containment and removal of the oil, and for specified damages, including damages to
natural resources.! The party responsible for the spill covers the cost of the damage
assessment, as well. The law is one of three federal laws that establish the right of the
government, acting on behalf of the public, to sue to collect damages for injury to natural
resources. (The other two laws are the Clean Water Act of 1972 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).)6
Measuring damage to natural resources. According to the federal law, the standard for
measuring natural resource damages is "diminution of value,"7 and court decisions have
held that assessment of the value of natural resources must include both direct use values
and passive use values that can be reliably calculated.! Direct use values derive from both
consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of natural resources, such as fishing and
birdwatching, respectively. "Passive use values include.. .the value of knowing the
resource is available for use by family and friends, or the general public, the value derived
4 33 USC 2701.
5 Susan A. Austin, "The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Proposed Rules for Natural
Resource Damage Assessment Under the Oil Pollution Act," Harvard Environmental Law Review, Vol.
18:549. 1994.
6 Austin, Op. Cit.
7 Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 15 CFR Part
990, Notice of proposed rulemaking (quoting OPA Conference Report). Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 5,
Jan. 7, 1994, p. 1073.
8 NOAA Notice of proposed rulemaking, Op. Cit. (citing D.C. Circuit Court decision on Ohio v. DOI),
Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 5, p. 1073.
from protecting the natural resource for its own sake; and the value of knowing that
future generations will be able to use the resource."9
Although courts have held that natural resource values include both direct and passive use
values, the specific kinds of values to be measured and the methods for measuring them
are uncertain and extremely controversial.10 Factors contributing to the uncertainty of
natural resource damage assessments include "the nascent state of restoration techniques,
the incompletely understood interactions among biological organisms, the unknown
toxicological effects of petroleum products, [and] the economic debate about appropriate
valuation methodologies.""1
Agencies responsible for conducting natural resource damage assessments following an oil
spill have been directed under federal and state laws to establish procedures to be followed
in conducting an assessment. Officials conducting an assessment would not be bound to
follow the established procedures. However, once such procedures are established, an
assessment done in accordance with them will enjoy a presumption of accuracy (a
"rebuttable presumption"), should it be challenged in court.
Natural resource trustees. The public officials authorized to assert claims against the
responsible party (the spiller) for injury to natural resources on behalf of the public are
known as natural resource "trustees." Under OPA, the President designates federal
officials, and the governor of each state designates state officials, to "act on behalf of the
public as trustees for natural resources under this Act."1 2 In the event of a spill, state
trustees are to "assess natural resource damages ... for the natural resources under their
trusteeship and ... develop and implement a plan for the restoration, rehabilitation,
9 NOAA Notice of proposed rulemaking, Op. Cit., Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 5, p. 1073.
'
0 NOAA Notice of proposed rulemaking, Op. Cit., Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 5, p. 1073.
" Ingrid Hansen, "Innovative procedures for natural resource damage assessment," in
Proceedings...[1995] Oil Spill Conference. Washington: American Petroleum Institute, 1995. p. 352.
12 The law defines natural resources as including the "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water,
drinking water, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, [or] held in trust by" the United
States, any state or local government, or Indian tribe, or any foreign government." (Oil Pollution Act, P.L.
101-380, Sec. 1001).
replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent, of the natural resources under their
trusteeship."' 3 The governor of Texas has designated three state agencies, the General
Land Office (GLO), the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (TNRCC),
and the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department as natural resource trustees (hereinafter
"trustees").
Liability limits. At the time OPA was enacted in 1990, 24 states had oil spill liability and
compensation laws, 17 of them without any specified limit on the amount of damages for
which a responsible party might be liable." Although OPA sets liability limits, it does not
pre-empt the state laws. The difficulty of determining the value of natural resources
complicates the establishment of liability limits because of the problem of "set[ting] an
appropriate limit on liability when it is unclear how to value the resource at risk.""'
OSPRA. The Texas legislature passed the state's first oil spill law in 1991, in response to
two significant spills off the Texas coast.' 6 The Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act
(OSPRA) did not set any limits on liability, but established an Oil Spill Commission to
look into the implications of not having such limits. The Oil Spill Commission reported its
findings and recommendations in 1993. It found that "an unlimited risk, such as natural
resource damages liability, is uninsurable," and recommended that OSPRA be amended to
ensure the continued health of the marine transportation industry.' 7
The commission also found that due to the ad hoc nature of damage assessments, the
controversy over economic valuation methods, and the "uncertainty involved in measuring
impairment and loss of natural resources," trustees were settling some damage
'3 Oil Pollution Act, P.L. 101-380, Sec. 1006; U S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 101st
Congress, Second Session, 1990, p. 495.
1 Legislative History, Oil Pollution Act of 1990. US. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
101st Congress, Second Session, 1990, p. 728.
15 Hansen (1995) Op. Cit. p. 351.
16 Hansen (1995) Op. Cit. (the Mega Borg and Apex oil spills, which occurred in the summer of 1990)
p. 351.
17 Hansen (1995) Op. Cit.
assessments more to avoid being challenged in court by the responsible party than to
ensure adequate compensation for the damaged resource."
In June 1993 the Texas legislature amended OSPRA in response to recommendations
made by the commission. The legislature set limits on liability equal to those established in
OPA, and directed state trustees to inventory existing resources to establish an
information base to aid in future damage assessments. To ensure that the three state
trustees present the responsible party with a unified assessment, the legislation directs the
trustees to enter a memorandum of agreement to cooperate in conducting assessments,
and designates the commissioner of the General Land Office to represent the consensus of
the trustees. Any disputed issues among the trustees are to be resolved through
mediation. And, as noted, the legislation directs the trustees to adopt damage assessment
procedures and protocols, and to do so using negotiated rulemaking with other interested
parties.'9 This undertaking by the trustees is considered in the following section.
The problem
The goal of the legislative mandate and the challenge facing the trustees was to identify
and establish rules for conducting natural resource damage assessments that would enable
trustees to accurately assess the damages and would be accepted as fair and reasonable by
the oil industry as well as by the public. Yet, how to assess natural resource damages is a
hotly debated question. As noted, there is a great deal of scientific uncertainty in
measuring the physical and biological impacts of a spill and determining the appropriate
restoration methods. Economic valuation techniques are controversial, and some
economists question whether it is even possible to measure passive use values with any
degree of reliability.20
1 Hansen (1995) p. 352.
19 Conference Committee Report, S.B. No. 1049, May 27, 1993.
20 "Ask a Silly Question...": Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages." Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 105, No. 8, June 1992; pp. 1981-2000.
Damage to natural resources can be very costly. Congress passed OPA in part to ensure
that the costs of natural resource damages would be borne by the polluter rather than by
the public,2 while the Exxon Valdez spill alerted the oil industry to the enormous costs
that can be incurred from a spill.22 Because the damage assessment procedures and
protocols adopted by the trustees would create a "rebuttable presumption of the amount
of [the] damages," 23 industry wanted to ensure that the rules would not go overboard and
create unnecessary costs, and trustees wanted to ensure that the rules would enable them
to assess damages as accurately as possible to ensure the responsible party would bear the
costs.
Key stakeholders
Ingrid Hansen, an attorney with the GLO, convened a committee to negotiate the damage
assessment procedures and protocols. The committee included representatives of the
three state natural resource trustees; representatives of the Texas Waterways Operators
Association and the Texas Mid-Continental Oil and Gas Association, representing the
owners and operators of oil transporting vessels and oil handling facilities, respectively;
and representatives of the Galveston Bay Foundation and the Galveston Bay National
Estuary Program, representing the public. 4
The state natural resource trustees. As noted, the GLO, the TNRCC, and the TPWD are
designated by the governor as the state's natural resource trustees under OPA. Under the
state law, OSPRA, the GLO is designated as the lead agency. As such, the commissioner
of the GLO is responsible for "represent[ing] the consensus position of the trustees
whenever a collective decision or agreement is required," invoking mediation when a
consensus among the trustees cannot be reached, and otherwise meeting the requirements
of the statute in conjunction with the other state trustees.25 The GLO's principal
21 Legislative History, Oil Pollution Act of 1990. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
10 1st Congress, Second Session, 1990, p. 723.
22 Hansen (1995) p. 352.
23 S.B. 1049 Conference Committee Report, p. 11.
24 TexReg 6525, June 1994.
25
.B. 1049 Conference Committee Report.
responsibility in the state is the management of more than 20 million acres of state-owned
lands.2 6 The TNRCC, formerly the Texas Water Commission, has jurisdiction over air and
water pollution control and solid waste management in the state. The TPWD regulates
hunting and fishing, manages the state parks and preserves," and is the principal wildlife
authority for the state.
As the lead agency, the GLO was concerned first of all with developing rules that all three
agencies could agree to. A history of jurisdictional tensions as well as the different
personalities involved led GLO representative Hansen to believe that getting the trustees
to agree on assessment procedures would be a challenge. In addition, due to the
controversy and uncertainty surrounding natural resource damage assessment methods,
she believed that any damage assessment procedures and protocols that the trustees might
adopt on their own would be considered suspect by both the public and industry, and
would likely be challenged.28
The TNRCC and TPWD were concerned about being tied to predetermined procedures
that might prove inadequate or inappropriate in a particular field situation. They wanted
the damage assessment protocols to contain enough flexibility for the trustees to respond
appropriately to the particulars of a given situation, and to use their best professional
judgment in conducting the assessment.2 9
Typically, trustees would be required to use the payments collected ("recoveries") from a
responsible party for the restoration of the spill site. In the case of small spills, the trustees
wanted the freedom to combine (or "pool") recoveries from multiple small spills to use in
funding regional or ecosystem-based restoration efforts.3" The reasoning was that in a bay
or estuarine ecosystem under stress from a number of forces, for example, combining
26 Hansen (1995) Op. Cit. p. 352.
27 Hansen (1995) Op. Cit. p. 352.
28 Hansen, pers. com., April 26, 1996, and December 16, 1996.
29 Letter from Hansen to author, April 26, 1995; Richard Seiler, TNRCC, personal communication, May
7, 1996.30 Richard Seiler, TNRCC, pers. com., May 1996.
small recoveries to further an existing, system-wide restoration and management plan
would likely produce net benefits over simply using the recoveries on fragmented areas
where the small spills occurred."
The legislation directed the trustees to invite the responsible party (the spiller) to
participate in the damage assessment. The TNRCC and TPWD opposed the suggestion,
made by environmentalists on the negotiating committee, to also invite a member of the
public from the affected community to participate in the assessment. The TNRCC and
TPWD representatives worried that a person unfamiliar with the complexities of the
trustee's task would simply be critical and would hamper the assessment process. The
GLO representative, who supported the idea of public participation, argued that allowing
the public to participate would help the public understand how complex the damage
assessment process is.
Industry: vessel and facility owners and operators. The persons liable for damages in the
event of an oil spill in coastal waters are the owners and operators of oil transport vessels
and oil handling facilities." The Texas Waterways Operators Association represented
transporters and the Texas Mid-Continental Oil and Gas Association represented facility
owners and operators. They were concerned about the potential costs that could be
incurred for natural resource damages resulting from oil spills under OSPRA, as well as
the costs of the assessment, which the party responsible for a spill is required to pay.
Although the 1993 OSPRA amendments include limits on liability 4 and require the
31 Seiler, pers. com., May 1996, and NOAA Notice of proposed rules, Federal Register, January 7, 1994,
p. 1073. (The issue of pooling recoveries is discussed relative to proposed federal damage assessment
rules.)
32 Hansen, pers. com., April, 1996.
" 9 TexReg 6525, June 1994.
1 The liability caps for vessels are the same as the federal limits: for vessels carrying oil in bulk, $1,200
per gross ton or, in the case of a vessel of 3,000 gross tons, $10 million; or in the case of a vessel of 3,000
gross tons or less, $2 million; or for any other vessel, $600 per gross ton or $500,000, whichever is
greater. The federal law does not establish liability limits on facilities. OSPRA set the caps at $70 per
barrel for facilities with capacity above 150,000 barrels, not to exceed $350,000,000; $10,000,000 for
facilities with capacity from 70,001 to 150,000 barrels; $5,000,000 for facilities with capacity from 30,001
to 70,000 barrels; $2,000,000 for facilities from 10,000 to 30,000 barrels, and for any other terminal,
$500,000 (S.B. 1049, Conference Committee Report, p. 22).
trustees to ensure that restoration or replacement costs of the damaged resources "not be
disproportionate to the value of the natural resource before injury" and that the trustees
use "the most cost effective method to achieve restoration,"3 giving industry greater
certainty about potential costs than before, costs remained its principal concern.
Industry sought to limit the use of some damage assessment methods, such as the use of
compensation formulas, an assessment technique trustees supported for its cost-
effectiveness, which would be utilized for assessing small spills.36 Industry argued that use
of such formulas becomes perfunctory, with too little attention to accurately reflecting the
actual extent and costs of damages." At the other end of the spectrum of assessment
techniques, industry sought to limit the use of some mathematical and computer models
that were expensive to utilize because of the many variables involved, which required
extensive sampling and testing to gather input data.
As noted in the background discussion above, some methods of economic valuation are
controversial, and none more so than "contingent valuation." Contingent valuation is the
only economic valuation method that has been devised to determine passive use values of
natural resources,39 through the use of interviews that ask people what they would be
willing to pay for an environmental amenity (or natural resource) or what they would be
willing to accept for the loss of an amenity or resource. Many economists object to the
use of contingent valuation, arguing that it is unreliable and results in the overvaluing of
resources.40 Contingent valuation and other non-market methods used to determine non-
market values have been developed in recognition that resources have values beyond those
reflected in markets --the means of evaluation favored by some economists and previously
35 S.B. 1049, Conference Committee Report, p. 17.36 Richard Seiler, pers. com.
3" Tom Reavley, pers. corn. (Use of formulas and models were extensively debated); Federal Register,
January 7, 1994, p. 1072 (some objections to NOAA's proposed use of compensation formulas).
38 Tom Reavley, pers. com.
39 Federal Register, January 7, 1994, p. 1074.
4* "Ask a Silly Question..." Harvard Law Review, Op. Cit. (On the other hand, as noted in Chapter 1,
some argue that any attempt to put a price on an object that is not normally traded on markets may have
the effect of lowering its perceived value. Nevertheless, the debate over contingent valuation in Texas
focused on whether using the technique would lead to inflated damage assessments. )
used by the Department of Interior (before court decisions reversed Interior's use of that
narrow approach).4 ' OPA, for example, "makes clear that forests are more than board
feet of lumber, and that seals and sea otters are more than just commodities traded on the
market."42 To limit the possibility of overvaluing resources, industry sought to limit the
use of contingent valuation, arguing that it should be used only for valuing permanent
damage or damage to unique resources such as endangered species.43
Industry opposed pooling small recoveries for use in a regional restoration plan because
they worried it could lead to industry being charged more than once for a spill, and that it
was contrary to the idea of compensatory damages and the requirement that a nexus exist
between damages recovered and their use to restore the damaged resource."
The public. Two Galveston Bay conservation organizations, the Galveston Bay
Foundation and the Galveston Bay National Estuary Program, represented the public on
the negotiated rulemaking committee. 45 They stressed the importance of having a
representative of the local community or other public representative participate in damage
assessments. One of the public representatives had a couple decades of experience
working on oil spill assessment and clean up issues, and pointed out that local
representatives could bring expertise on local conditions that would otherwise be missing
from the damage assessment.4 6
Other stakeholders, not on the negotiated rulemaking committee, included the marine
pollution insurance industry, admiralty law interests, and port operators. These interest
4' Legislative History, Oil Pollution Act of 1990, p. 737.
4 Legislative History, Oil Pollution Act of 1990. US. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
101st Congress, Second Session, 1990, p. 737.
4 Dan Hinkle, TMOGA, pers. com., and Federal Register, January 7, 1994, p. 1073 (arguments against
NOAA's proposed use of contingent valuation in damage assessments).
" Richard Seiler, pers. com. (pooling recoveries was an issue) and Federal Register, January 7, 1994
(comments in response to NOAA's proposal concerning pooled recoveries provides elaboration of industry
concerns).
4 9 TexReg 6525, June 1994.
46 Sharron Stewart, Galveston Bay National Estuary Program, pers. com., October 1996; Dan Hinkle,
TMOGA, also observed that industry and some local organizations had more expertise on some of the
issues than the trustees (pers. com., May 1996).
groups had participated on the Oil Spill Commission, whose recommendations led to the
OSPRA amendments. The negotiating committee also did not include fishers, some of
whom were still dealing with trustees and responsible persons on issues relating to a 1990
spill; or representatives from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAH) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the federal agencies with
jurisdiction relating to oil spills. The GLO representative who convened the negotiating
committee was concerned that the OSPRA amendments under which the negotiating
committee was operating were so specific that there would be difficulty reconciling
statutory constraints with suggestions that were likely to come from federal
representatives. NOAA and FWS were invited to attend meetings, but were not invited to
be part of the negotiating committee. The omission of key stakeholding groups from a
negotiated rulemaking committee is contrary to the idea of negotiated rulemaking. The
process of convening this committee and negotiating the damage assessment protocols is
discussed in the next section.
The process
As noted, the 1993 OSPRA amendments direct the state natural resource trustees to
develop the damage assessment procedures and protocols using "negotiated rulemaking
with other interested parties."4"8 Ingrid Hansen, an attorney with the GLO who was
involved in the legislative negotiations to amend OSPRA, made the suggestion. She had
heard that negotiated rulemaking had been used by the federal government, including the
Coast Guard in developing oils spill response plans. It seemed like it would work here.49
At the time, Hansen did not know a considerable body of writing existed on both the
theory and practice of negotiated rulemaking. What she assumed "negotiated rulemaking"
meant, and the way she explained it as the OSPRA bill was being discussed, was to bring
together representatives of all interested parties from the start, bringing them together to
work on developing the rule.' Her suggestion was supported by the general counsel of
47 Hansen, pers. com., April 26, 1996.
48 Conference Committee Report, S.B. No. 1049, May 27, 1993 p. 13.
49 Hansen, letter to author, April 1996, and pers. corn., April 1996.50 Hansen, pers. com., December 1996.
the GLO, and no one opposed the idea, which did not receive much attention. The
requirement to use negotiated rulemaking to develop the assessment protocols was
subsequently incorporated into the OSPRA amendments."
Hansen had several reasons to suggest negotiating the regulations. Her greatest concern
was getting the three natural resource trustees to agree on a set of procedures and
protocols. In view of past contentious inter-agency interactions, the personalities
involved, and tensions between the agencies over "turf," getting the agencies to agree on
any set of damage assessment procedures promised to be a challenge. She thought that a
public process might encourage the trustees to work more cooperatively to reach mutually
acceptable procedures."
In addition, the issue of damage assessments was controversial. Contingent valuation,
especially, was being held up as a threat to the oil transporting and oil handling industries.
Even if the agencies could agree on the procedures and protocols, given the controversial
nature of the issue, Hansen believed that industry would object to any procedures the
trustees developed on their own."
Finally, she wished to guard against both the possibility of last minute, behind-the-scenes
changes to the rules, once agreement was reached, and allegations of any behind-the-scene
changes or deals. Such a last-minute change had just occurred in the OSPRA
amendments: the statute contains a substantive change from the version negotiators who
worked on the bill thought was the "final" draft. The statute designates the commissioner
of the GLO as spokesperson for the trustees, making the GLO the lead agency, even
though the idea of designating the GLO as lead agency had been proposed, discussed, and
rejected, during the legislative negotiations. The modification surprised GLO
5' Hansen letter, April 1996; SB 1049 Conference Committee Report.
52 Hansen, pers. com., April and December 1996.
5 Hansen, pers. com., April 1996.
representative Hansen,54 and understandably raised some suspicions among the other
trustees about possible GLO involvement."
Hansen convened a negotiating committee in November 1993. She defined stakeholders
as those who have liability under OSPRA: the oil handling facility owners and operators
and the vessel owners and operators. 6 They were represented on the committee by the
Texas Mid-Continental Oil and Gas Association and the Texas Waterways Operators
Association. Hansen also sought representatives from environmental groups to participate
on the committee. However, finding groups willing and able to participate was difficult
because the groups that were contacted had very limited resources and most groups were
not focused on the issue of natural resource damage assessments. The two environmental
organizations that did want to participate were the Galveston Bay National Estuary
Program (GBNEP) and the Galveston Bay Foundation. Both groups had experience with
oil spill issues, as a couple major spills had occurred in their vicinity in recent years, one in
Galveston Bay and one off the coast nearby." The other two natural resource trustees,
the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission and the Texas Parks and Wildlife
Department, also were represented on the committee.
The committee, dubbed the Negotiated Rulemaking Group (NRG), met for the first time
in November 1993. During that meeting it became clear to Hansen that she would be
unable to move the talks forward as a facilitator and at the same time advocate for her
agency. She turned to the University of Texas Law School Center for Public Policy
Dispute Resolution for assistance in identifying a facilitator. The Center's director, Jan
Summers, attended the NRG's next meeting as an observer. She agreed the group needed
the assistance of a neutral and agreed to find one. Tom Reavley, a lawyer with a
mediation practice in Austin, was hired by the GLO as the group's facilitator before the
group met next, in February 1994. The son of a well-respected district judge, Reavley
' Hansen, pers. com., 4/96 and 12/96.
ss Richard Seiler, pers. com.
56 Hansen, pers. com.
57 Hansen, letter, April 26, 1996; pers. com.
himself had a solid reputation, and was accepted by all the members of the NRG. At that
time, the Center also conducted a training session on negotiated rulemaking for the NRG.
According to Hansen, the whole dynamic of the group changed when Reavley came
aboard, and everyone became more comfortable with the process."
During a meeting, an issue would be introduced and its pros and cons discussed, as
negotiators attempted to discover how set the others were on the issue and what the
underlying concerns were.' 9 The facilitator's assistance was critical in helping the
negotiators explore issues, keeping discussions on track, pointing out when certain
approaches (such as arguing) were not being helpful, and knowing when to put aside a
particularly thorny issue in order to move forward.60 When technical issues were under
discussion, the industry representatives (who were both attorneys) occasionally brought in
technical experts to make presentations, after getting the group's okay. Experts were
available to answer questions and discuss issues with the committee. 1
Some of the tougher technical issues, such as which assessment techniques to use in a
particular circumstance, were not precisely resolved. Instead, the final rules specify some
assessment techniques while admitting the possibility that trustees may use others. Using
phrases such as "including but not limited to" and allowing "best professional judgment"
helped clarify the techniques that the group agreed were most appropriate, while giving
the trustees the flexibility they believed they needed.62
Going into the regulatory negotiations, two of the trustees felt their agencies had not had
adequate input in the preceding legislative process (although the agencies had been
represented). The new statute had placed limitations on the way these trustees did their
jobs and also mandated their participation in the current negotiated rulemaking, which
58 Hansen, pers. com.
59 Hinkle, pers. com., May 1, 1996.
60 Hansen, pers. com., April 26, 1996 and letter of April 26, 1996; Hinkle, pers. com. May 1, 1996; Seiler,
pers. com., May 7, 1996.
61 Hinkle, pers. com., May 1, 1996.
62 Hansen letter, April 26, 1996.
created an adversarial atmosphere. 63 The strained history leading to the negotiated
rulemaking and resentment about the mandated participation was never completely
surmounted. Nevertheless, one of the trustee representatives acknowledged that the
process had been beneficial, that bringing the parties together had helped everyone
become more familiar with the others' concerns, and this had led to greater cooperation;
he believed his agency had made some gains while not losing anything.64 Negotiations
concluded in June 1994 and the proposed rules were published in the Texas Register in
August. Some minor clarifications were made in response to comments, and the GLO
announced adoption of the new rules on October 4, 1994.6
Discussion
The underlying issues. The complexity and uncertainty of assessing natural resource
damages presents the Texas natural resource trustees with many of the thorny issues
discussed in Chapter 1: measuring the impact of spilled oil on natural resources, designing
appropriate and cost-effective restoration plans, and determining the economic value of
damaged natural resources that cannot be mitigated, or the lost value until they recover,
are complex problems rife with uncertainty. The regulated industry is concerned about
costs for which it might be liable, as well as the fairness and legitimacy of the assessment
and the manner in which the assessed liability claims are to be used to repair and restore
injured resources. Affected communities and other members of the public also have an
interest in ensuring that the natural resource damages are appropriately assessed. Damage
assessment questions are further complicated by the involvement of three state agencies
having different perspectives, institutional mandates, and responsibilities. The damage
assessment process the trustees had been using was adversarial and, according to the Oil
Spill Commission, sometimes led to damage claim being decided more to avoid a costly
legal battle over the assessment than to ensure appropriate compensation for damaged
66
resources.
63 Seiler, pers. corn., May 7, 1996.
"Seiler, pers. com., May 7, 1996.
65 19 TexReg 6525-6526.
* Hansen (1995) p. 352.
The role of legislation. Many of the difficulties associated with natural resource damage
assessment were addressed by the legislature prior to the negotiated rulemaking. The
legislation specifies some of the procedures and protocols the trustees are to use and is
narrowly drawn to limit agency discretion. Recognizing the limitations of the traditional
adversarial approach in dealing with the complexity and uncertainty of a damage
assessment, the legislation calls for interest representation, greater cooperation, and
mediation to settle disputes related to the damage assessment. The legislation directs the
trustees to invite the responsible person (the spiller) to participate in the damage
assessment, requires trustees and industry to share any photographs and samples taken in
the course of a damage assessment, requires the trustees to enter a memorandum of
agreement to resolve through mediation any internal disputes related to the assessment,
and requires disputes between the trustees and the responsible person to be mediated
before any court has jurisdiction to review an assessment challenge. 7
Elements of the rule. In terms of rules, the NRG
e established a list of scientific and economic assessment procedures and protocols that
trustees may use in determining, quantifying, and valuing natural resource injury and loss
of services in any field investigation;
e expanded upon the statutory requirement that trustees and the responsible person
share assessment photographs and sampling data to include sharing of all assessment data
upon written request of the other party;
o entitled trustees to pool compensation recovered from more than one assessment claim
to execute a restoration project;
* agreed that trustees could limit the participation by the responsible person (who
trustees are required by law to invite to participate) if the trustees agree the responsible
person is interfering with their responsibilities or causing delay;
67 S.B. 1049 Conference Committee Report. According to Hansen of the GLO, Texas laws are typically
specific, to limit agency discretion (pers. com., April 26, 1996).
0 provide a mechanism by which the responsible person may rejoin the assessment
process;
* expanded public participation opportunities by providing the public an opportunity to
review and comment on assessment procedures and protocols selected for any negotiated,
expedited, or comprehensive assessment; and by providing that members of the public
would be invited to participate in the development and design of resource plans for their
area. 6
The most important thing the process accomplished, though, was to give the outcome
legitimacy. Given the history of turf conflicts between the agencies, and the apparent
tensions among the agencies coming out of the legislative process, what was needed was a
process that all the trustees, as well as industry and environmental interests, would view as
legitimate; and that met their interests. The negotiated rulemaking process, including
highly valued assistance from the neutral facilitator, provided this.
Sturm argues that the norms of impartiality, participation, and rational decisionmaking are
critical to the legitimacy and acceptance of an outcome that multiple affected interests will
be expected to live with.69 In this case, the trustees themselves, as well as the regulated
community and the public, needed to be convinced of the legitimacy of the rulemaking
process, since two of the trustees felt the antecedent legislative process had not
sufficiently considered their interests. The negotiated rulemaking provided the
opportunity for the key stakeholders to exchange information and debate the merits of
assessment techniques and other issues, with a trusted neutral to keep the discussion from
getting bogged down, to produce procedures and protocols that met each party's
interests. Unquestionably, the scope of the rulemaking assignment was quite limited in
this instance, and, as the GLO's Ingrid Hansen has observed, much of the innovation in
the protocols came out of the legislative process." Nevertheless, the negotiated
68 S.B. 1049 Conference Committee Report.
69 Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies," Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 79, No. 5, June
1991.
70 Hansen (1995), and pers.com.
rulemaking process did serve to encourage impartiality, participation and rational
decisionmaking, and enhanced the legitimacy of the rules as a consequence.
Was it successful? Alternative dispute resolution professionals stress the importance of
considering both process and outcome in assessing the success of a negotiated rulemaking
or public dispute resolution process. 71 Measures of success include the extent to which
participants believe the effort satisfies their interests; the fairness of the process; its
efficiency; whether the community at large believes a good precedent has been set; how
the negotiations affected relationships of those involved; the stability and feasibility of the
agreement; and its wisdom.
By standards that can be evaluated today, the natural resource damage assessment
negotiated rulemaking was successful. It provided an opportunity for the key stakeholders
to meaningfully participate in developing the procedures and protocols. Although not all
affected interests participated, the key stakeholders appear to have been identified and
involved. The neutral facilitator played a critical part in helping ensure that each member
of the committee was heard. Some relationships between participants improved, and it
appears that none deteriorated. The protocols were developed within the time frame the
legislature and trustees had hoped, and elicited relatively minor comments when they were
published.
Time will tell if the protocols are stable and wise. Stability depends in part on the
feasibility of the regulations and their legitimacy. Because the merits of pertinent issues
were debated and discussed by key stakeholders who will be responsible for implementing
them, it is likely that the regulations finally agreed to are, in fact, feasible. Because the
negotiated rulemaking process aimed to involve the key stakeholders in a fair and open
process, the outcome has legitimacy. The prospects for stability appear, therefore, to be
good. The wisdom of the protocols will depend on how well they work in the field. To
71 Evaluation criteria taken from Susskind and Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse, Op. Cit.; Gail
Binghamn, Resolving Environmental Disputes. Washington: The Conservation Foundation, 1986; and
Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, Op. Cit.
the extent the new procedures and protocols improve the accuracy of damage
assessments, and enhance efficiency and cooperation, they may be viewed as wise.
Shortcomings. This regulatory negotiation was successful despite some important
shortcomings. According to proponents of negotiated rulemaking, the prenegotiation
phase, during which the conflict is assessed and affected interests are identified, is usually
critical. The aim of the conflict assessment and convening process is to ensure that
representatives of all identified interests have the opportunity to participate on the
negotiated rulemaking committee. This can help ensure that the committee will consider
all the pertinent facts and help protect the outcome from being challenged by an interest
that was excluded.
Ideally, a neutral party conducts the conflict assessment, interviewing stakeholders to learn
what issues are involved and which issues are considered by each party to be the most
important. A neutral convener is recommended in order to encourage parties to be as
candid as possible about their interests with respect to the issue. The convener also asks
who else she needs to talk to, in order to identify as many of the significantly affected
interest groups as possible.
Arguably, all the groups represented on the Oil Spill Commission -- the marine pollution
insurance industry, fishers, port operators, and admiralty law interests -- have a significant
stake in the way natural resource damage assessments are conducted, and as such
belonged on the negotiated rulemaking committee. It is conceivable that any of these
interests, in they were sufficiently unhappy with the outcome, could have mounted a
significant challenge. Of course, representatives of these interests already had an
important say in the issue, since it was the commission's recommendations that prompted
the OSPRA amendments in the first place. And, judging from the minor comments
received n response to the proposed rules, the concerns of significant interest groups were
in fact sufficiently addressed by the NRG.
Another shortcoming of this negotiated rulemaking can be traced to the fact that it was
mandatory -- required in the OSPRA amendments. It is generally considered important by
negotiated rulemaking proponents to keep the process voluntary. As long as participation
is voluntary, the reasoning goes, participants are at the table because they see it as being in
their best interest to be there. Likewise, as long as anyone can decline to come to the
table or can walk away at any time, all parties have an incentive to pay attention to the
other parties' concerns. That motivation to pay attention to the concerns and interests of
others, as well as one's own, is a key to developing an outcome that all parties can live
with.
One of the trustee representatives, who felt his agency's interests were not adequately
considered during the legislative phase, felt that he had no choice but to participate in the
negotiated rulemaking in order to protect the agency's interests, and did not appreciate
not having a choice. Still, the negotiated rulemaking mandate did not greatly damage the
process or the perceived legitimacy of the outcome. Analysts of negotiated agreements
72have found that mandated talks can work if negotiators have other reasons to participate.
In this case, the trustees had a stake in making the process succeed because they
understood that if it failed, industry could go to the legislature to get a new bill to resolve
the issue."
OHIO: CONSTRUCTION AND DEMOLITION DEBRIS RULES
The problem
Construction and demolition debris (CDD) landfills were unregulated in Ohio in 1990,
when concerns about potential groundwater contamination and a couple serious fires at
CDD facilities prompted the state legislature to pass a law governing them. The statute
directs the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) to develop the implementing
72 Timothy J. Sullivan, "Difficulties of Mandatory Negotiation," in Resolving Environmental Regulatory
Disputes, p. 74.
' Hansen letter, April 1996.
regulations, including facility design and construction standards, controls over access and
operation; groundwater monitoring requirements and standards for the installation of
monitoring wells; requirements for contingency plans in case of fire or explosion; and
closure and financial assurance requirements. The law specifies that new facilities cannot
be located in floodplains or over sole source aquifers, although existing facilities in such
locations may continue to operate and in some instances expand.7 4
In April 1992 the OEPA distributed draft regulations to interested parties for comment.
The wide range of diverse and conflicting comments that came back left the agency
uncertain about how to respond. The short-staffed agency extended the comment period
as it considered the matter. After more than a year the agency learned through its legal
department that the Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management
(OCDRCM) was seeking candidates for alternative dispute resolution demonstration
projects, including negotiated rulemaking. The OCDRCM assisted the agency in
determining that negotiated rulemaking would be appropriate for developing the CDD
rules (see next chapter for commonly used evaluation criteria), and the agency applied for
and received a $10,000 grant which it used to initiate the effort.
Key stakeholders
Key stakeholders included local health departments, which have responsibility for
enforcing the regulations; large and small CDD facility operators; CDD generators, such
as building contractors; local and county governments; environmental and public interest
groups; and the agency, OEPA. Health departments were concerned about the cost and
technical expertise required to implement the new regulations. Different health
departments had submitted widely divergent comments on the proposed regulations.
Some thought the regulations were too strict, others thought they were not strict enough.
CDD facility operators were chiefly concerned about the cost of the new regulations, but
there was a range of responses from operators, as well. Some CDD operators also
74
"Summary of the Construction and Demolition Debris Law and Rules" memorandum to Interested
Parties from Don Slivka through Barbara Brdicka, Chief, Division of Solid and Infectious Waste
Management (DSIWM), (undated).
questioned the validity of scientific studies that provided the basis for groundwater
monitoring requirements and other provisions in the regulations. Of the four facility
operators on the committee at the outset, the two operators of small CDD facility were
more concerned about the new requirements and their associated costs than the large
facility operators.75 OEPA was concerned about fulfilling its responsibility of
implementing the new law, and faced a challenge in responding to and reconciling the wide
range of opinion expressed by commenters. The agency was particularly concerned about
addressing the diverse views expressed by local health officials.76
The Process
OCDRCM assisted the agency by first evaluating the prospective rule to determine
whether it was appropriate for negotiated rulemaking, and then helping to prepare a
request for proposal (RFP) to hire a facilitator to convene a rulemaking committee and
facilitate the rulemaking process, and recommending places to send the RFPs. The agency
received two proposals, and hired a team of two facilitators, Suzanne Orenstein, vice
president of RESOLVE, a dispute resolution center in Washington, D.C. and Jerry
Lawson, executive director of the Center for the Resolution of Disputes in Cincinnati.
The proposal for the team came from RESOLVE, and Orenstein served as lead
facilitator.77 The agency used the OCDRCM grant to get started and hire the
facilitators, 8 and the agency covered the balance of the costs.79 To help identify
stakeholders, the agency provided the facilitators a list of those who had commented on
the proposed rules. The facilitators convened a 19-member negotiated rulemaking
committee, which included representatives of health departments, CDD facility operators;
CDD generators; a quarry operator, local and county governments; a groundwater
scientist; environmental and public interest groups; and OEPA, which was represented by
the chief of the Division of Solid and Infectious Waste Management (DSIWM) .
5 Don Slivka, Environmental Specialist, OEPA DSIWM, pers. com., April 1996.
76 Brdicka, Chief, DSIWM, pers. com., April 30, 1996.
" Slivka, pers. com.
78 Brdicka, pers. com.
79 Slivka, pers. com. By the end of the process, costs for the facilitators services was $70,000 according to
Slivka.
Initially, ten meetings were held over the course of a year." The agency rented a
conference facility for each meeting."' (This can help ensure the neutrality of the setting
for all participants, but adds to the costs of the process.) Meetings were open to the
public and regularly attended by interested observers and reported in a trade publication;
people occasionally addressed the committee from the floor.8 2 The group "got stuck" on
the issue of groundwater monitoring. Some doubted that CDD waste posed enough risk
to warrant groundwater monitoring. They doubted the scientific basis for a monitoring
requirement, and questioned whether the benefits of monitoring justified the costs. 3
The OEPA representative acknowledged there were problems with some of the studies the
agency had used to draft the regulation. Some dated back to the 1960s and 1970s, and
some failed to distinguish between municipal solid waste (MSW) and CDD, which is now
generally believed to be less hazardous that MSW. Other members of the committee
brought to the table more recent leachate studies they had. However, the committee
continued to disagree about the interpretation of the newer studies, and whether or not
groundwater monitoring should be required in all areas or only in areas where the
groundwater was especially vulnerable due to local geology. The agency said it would be
willing to accept an agreement if one could be reached by the opposing sides on the
84issue.
Eventually, after meeting for a year, the committee reached agreement that all members
could "live with," and the agency submitted the draft rules to a committee of the state
legislature for review, according to the state's administrative procedures. In the
meantime, however, an association of small CDD facility operators had organized and
approached the legislative committee, urging it not to approve the rules. This group of
s* Slivka, pers. com..
8' Slivka, pers. com.
92 Jerry Lawson, pers. com.
83 Brdicka, pers. com.
" Brdicka, pers. com.
facility operators argued that the proposal was too expensive and would put some of them
out of business. The legislative committee encouraged the agency to withdraw the
proposed rules and reconvene the reg-neg committee to take another look at the
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operators' concerns.
The negotiating committee reconvened, adding three small facility operators and one more
generator to the committee. The second committee grappled with the question of costs
and reconvened a subcommittee to investigate the costs of landfill liners, capping systems,
and measures to assure quality control. The question facing the committee was whether
costs could be lowered without sacrificing environmental protection. After four more
meetings, the committee reached agreement on all except one issue, which concerned
groundwater monitoring. In light of the impasse, the parties agreed to defer to the
commissioner of OEPA on that issue. Although the committee members did not formally
sign on to an endorsement of the rules, they all did agree not to block implementation or
sue. The regulations took effect as planned on September 30, 1996.
Discussion
The underlying issues. Predictably, the costs of the new regulations were of paramount
concern to the regulated community. And because the smaller operators were less able to
absorb new costs, the impacts of the regulations would hit them harder than the larger
facility operators. This illustrates the concern about fairness discussed in the first chapter,
that even when regulations are applied evenly, they can be unfair in practice because they
86have uneven impacts.
The science underlying the proposed rule was challenged by CDD operators who disputed
assumptions made in the studies cited by OEPA, arguing that the studies were not only
outdated, but some had erroneously combined results of tests at both solid waste landfills
and CDD landfills." The operators argued that more current research showed that CDD
85 Brdicka, pers. com. April 30, 1996.
86 Susskind, Bacow, and Wheeler. Resolving Environmental Regulatory Disputes, Op. Cit.
87 Slivka, pers. com.
poses less threat to groundwater supplies than solid waste, and that current science
therefore did not justify regulating CDD landfills as stringently as was proposed. When
committee members brought more current research to the discussion, different members
continued to disagree on the interpretation and regulatory implications of the new studies.
And the regulations affected a range of stakeholders with widely divergent perspectives,
whose comments had exposed a dimension of the agency's rulemaking task in the first
place. Comments in response to the agency's initial draft rule had been "all over the map"
according to the head of the Solid and Infectious Waste Management division."
Elements of the rule. Regulations developed by the negotiated rulemaking committee
include the following provisions:89
" design, construction, operation, closure, and financial assurance requirements;
* annual license requirements to establish, maintain, or modify a facility; license
requirements include facility design plan; letter from local fire department; financial
assurance documentation; debris placement plan; and drawings showing surface water
runoff and runoff control structures;
" certain exemptions for construction debris used as fill;
* exemptions from liner and leachate collection system requirements for filled areas of
existing sites;
* limitations on the types of waste that can be accepted: readily identifiable construction
and demolition debris, stumps and trunks are acceptable; fly ash and foundry sand may be
accepted subject to additional provisions, and asbestos subject to air control permit
requirements; hazardous or infectious wastes cannot be accepted, neither can
containerized or bulk liquids or solid wastes other than those specified.
8" Brdicka, pers. com.8 9 
"Summary of the Construction and Demolition Debris Law and Rules," memo to interested parties from
Don Slivka through Barbara Brdicka, Chief, Division of Solid and Infectious Waste Management
(DSIWM), undated.
Modifications made by the expanded committee include:
o grace periods for submission of parts of the facility design plan were established for
existing facilities;
" thickness of recompacted soil liner, when required, was reduced;
e select debris and other wastes can be used as drainage medium for leachate collection
system;
o leachate collection system is allowed to be constructed in phases.
Decided by agency director: (The negotiating committee was unable to reach agreement
on this issue; director based his decision on documentation provided by the committee).
o groundwater monitoring requirements.
In response to a suggestion by some members of the negotiated rulemaking committee,
the Division of Solid and Infectious Waste Management staff is developing guidance
documents to supplement the regulations.
Was it successful? The rulemaking had undeniable shortcomings, which are discussed
below. On the positive side, the committee was able to reach agreement on most of a rule,
and to agree to defer to the judgment of the agency director on the contested issue.
Producing a rule that has overall acceptance is a reasonable measure of success, given the
wide range of views on the topic.
The negotiated rulemaking process provided a forum for the agency to explain, as one of
the participants, the legislative constraints under which the rules were written. For
example, some of the commenters had pointed out inconsistencies in regulations pertaining
to the protection of sole sources aquifers as compared with other drinking water aquifers.
The agency was able to explain that the different approaches were mandated in the
legislation. Because the agency was one of the participants, it could present this kind of
information less as a defense of the rules, as it might in other circumstances have been, and
more as an invitation to the group to help address the challenges presented by the
legislation.
Moreover, regulating CDD facilities was new regulatory territory for the agency. The
reg-neg provided stakeholders the opportunity to not only share their concerns and explain
their interests, but to bring to the table valuable scientific information that would
otherwise be missing. As noted in Chapter 1, administrative law has evolved partly in
recognition that, given the technical complexity of environmental regulations, agencies
cannot be expected to have all the expertise needed to appropriately address a particular
issue. Thus, greater emphasis has been placed on ensuring that affected interests -- who
may have more specific information and expertise on a topic -- have the opportunity to
influence the development of proposed rules. (The Texas negotiated rulemaking
experience also revealed that industry and environmental groups believed that, in some
areas, they had more expertise than the trustees charged with conducting the damage
assessments.)
The negotiations provided a forum to bring together stakeholders with different interests
and different points of view to attempt, with the help of neutrals, to reconcile those
differences. The facilitators helped maintain a productive pace and kept the negotiators
focused on problem solving.90 As noted, it was not something the agency had figured out
how to do alone.
Shortcomings:
It's fair to say that this negotiated rulemaking had some important shortcomings The
central problem was the failure of the conflict assessment to identifying appropriate
representatives of the regulated community. Identifying key interests is a central part of
the conflict assessment stage of a public dispute resolution process. In addition to
exploring the underlying concerns of the party being interviewed, the convener asks who
else they need to talk to. The convener knows they have located the key players when
94 Brdicka, pers. com.
they stop hearing new names.91 Such an approach helps, but still may not resolve the
problem of relatively unorganized interests, as the CDD operators were in this case. Not
only is there a problem of how to identify and select the appropriate representative of the
interest group, but also a mechanism for the representative to report back to constituents
on the progress of the negotiations must be found. In the case of the CDD negotiations, it
took impending regulations to motivate some of the small operators to organize and
identify some representatives, and it is unclear how they might have done so sooner.
As OEPA learned, most CDD facilities are small operations, and the operators were not
organized as a cohesive interest group when the negotiated rulemaking got underway.
The problem of identifying these key stakeholders was present from the start. The agency
sought names and addresses of CDD facilities from local health departments when it first
sent out its proposed rules for comment.92 However, since CDD facilities were
unregulated at the time, it is likely that most health departments did not have complete
information, and, because health departments do regulate municipal solid waste facilities,
it is also likely that solid waste facilities were included on the initial list of parties receiving
the agency's draft rules. Thus the comments that were received from "industry" may have
been skewed to reflect the perspectives of the already-regulated solid waste industry more
than those of CDD facility operators. Over the course of the negotiations the agency
learned about differences between CDD and solid waste, as well as differences in small,
independent CDD operations and much larger, national solid waste companies, and that
one could not appropriately represent the other. 9 3
By the time additional small CDD operators joined the committee, after appealing to the
legislature, much work had been done and the committee was unable to revisit all of the
issues that had been settled. The expanded committee did revise timetables for
implementation, taking a more graduated approach to make it more possible for small
9' Susan Carpenter and W. J. D. Kennedy. Managing Public Disputes. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988,
"Analyzing the Conflict," pp. 71-91.
92 Brdicka, pers. com.
93 Slivka, pers. com.
operators to comply. However, it is not clear that all participants' interests were met as
well as might be expected under more ideal circumstances. The agency was able to
produce regulations that were acceptable to all the affected interests, however, and given
the disparity of opinion that started the process, this must be considered a significant
achievement. The problem in identifying important stakeholders impacted the efficiency of
the process, since after a year of meetings and reaching a tentative agreement, the
committee was asked by the state legislature to reconvene.
Because the committee could not agree on the regulatory implications of the scientific data
concerning groundwater monitoring, the long term stability of the agreement may be in
doubt. However, the commissioner of OEPA, who made the final decision on
groundwater monitoring issues that the committee had been unable to agree upon, did
review all the committee's notes and findings, which gives greater credibility and
legitimacy to his decision than any the agency may have made unilaterally at the start.
MAINE: THE SENSIBLE TRANSPORTATION POLICY ACT REGULATIONS
The problem
In 1985, to solve the problem of traffic congestion on the Maine Turnpike in southern
Maine, the Maine Turnpike Authority (MTA) proposed to widen a 30-mile section of the
turnpike, at a cost of $100 million. 94 The expansion was approved by state lawmakers and
considered to be necessary by the Maine Department of Transportation (MDOT), the lead
transportation agency in state.9' Others in the state, however, believed the root of the
traffic problem was not inadequate roadway, but the failure of traditional strategies such
as expanding roadway capacity to manage transportation demand, and that the state
" Jonathan W. Reitman and Ann R. Gosline, "Transportation Planning Model for the Future: Maine's
road from referendum to reform," Consensus, No. 22, April 1994.
95 Sondra Bogdonoff, "Consensus Building to Write Environmentally Responsive Rules for Maine's New
Transportation Policy," in Mediating Environmental Conflicts, J. Walton Blackburn and Willa Marie
Bruce, eds.; Quorum Books, Westport, CT; 1995; p. 153.
needed to broaden its approach to transportation planning and policy. In response to the
decision to expand the turnpike, a coalition of environmental and other public interest
groups led by the Natural Resources Council of Maine (NRCM) launched a referendum
campaign to require MDOT to focus on means other than new highway construction to
manage transportation demand.96
The referendum called for MDOT to give preference to demand management strategies
that did not involve highway construction, and to consider energy costs, air pollution,
environmental impacts, local and regional goals and concerns, and the needs of all citizens
in its decision making. 97 MDOT fought the referendum, arguing that the highway
expansion was needed and that the policy requirements in the referendum would mire the
agency in red tape.98 The campaign, which went on for about a year and a half, was bitter
and divisive. In November 1991 the "Sensible Transportation Policy Act" passed by a
solid 59-41 percent margin,99 leaving MDOT in charge of implementing a law it had
vigorously opposed.
After the vote, MDOT Commissioner Dana Connors, who had been a vocal critic of the
referendum, announced that "the people have spoken" and indicated his agency would
endeavor to meet the requirements of the act.' 00 The NRCM and other referendum
backers, however, were concerned about whether the act could be successfully
implemented by an agency that plainly had doubted its merits and practicability.' 1 The
referendum victory had also helped bolster the position of NRCM and other groups
traditionally excluded from transportation planning processes, that they had a right to be
involved in the development of state transportation policy.10 2
* Bogdonoff, Op. Cit.
9 7 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit; Reitman and Gosline, Op. Cit.
98 Reitman and Gosline, Op. Cit; Beth Nagusky, principal attorney at NRCM during referendum
campaign, pers. com. May 2, 1996; Dana Connors, former commissioner of MDOT, pers. com. December
11, 1996.
9 Reitman and Gosline, Op. Cit.
10Reitman and Gosline, Op. Cit.
101 Nagusky, pers. com., May 2, 1996.
102 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit.
A delegation of referendum backers approached the commissioner to propose that all key
parties participate in writing the implementing regulations, through the consensus process
of negotiated rulemaking.103 The suggestion came from Beth Nagusky, then lead attorney
for NRCM, who had read some articles by Philip Harter, a leading proponent of
negotiated rulemaking, and had heard him speak on the topic. The idea had already gotten
some favorable press, apparently the result of an offhand remark by Nagusky, that the case
seemed suited to negotiated rulemaking, during an informal conversation with a
reporter.10 4 MDOT was hesitant at first. The commissioner was confident that his
department was fully capable of writing the implementing regulations, and saw some
benefit in the agency's moving forward to do just that, as a way to improve department
morale and demonstrate the department's capabilities. On the other hand, he also saw a
critical need to start healing the divisions that had been created by the rough, bitter
campaign, and recognized that negotiated rulemaking could be useful in that regard.'45 He
agreed to the proposal chiefly on basis of its potential to begin healing past wounds.
MDOT staff was concerned about the prospect of nonexperts being in a position of
deciding agency policy, that the process would not necessarily produce the best rule, and
that the agency would lose authority over regulations it was responsible for
implementing.10 A conference call between Harter and department staff helped reassure
the agency that using the process would not relinquish its authority over the regulations.10 7
Eventually the agency agreed, and hired two facilitators to convene a committee and
conduct the negotiations.
Key stakeholders
Three key groups had significant interests in state transportation policy and planning:
environmental and public interest groups, business interests, and the state transportation
agencies.
103 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 154.
** Nagusky, pers. com. May, 1996, and December 1996.
1s Connors, pers. com., December 1996.
106Tom Reeves, MDOT chief counsel and lead negotiator MDOT in the transportation rule negations,
pers. com., 12/11/96.
107 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit.
Environmental and other nongovernmental public interest groups (the referendum
backers): NRCM spearheaded the referendum effort. The most active environmental
group working on transportation issues in the state, NRCM had been frustrated by MTA's
proposed remedy to traffic congestion and their own inability to influence transportation
policy.10 8 They were joined in the campaign by Maine Audubon, and other environmental,
alternative transportation, and public interest groups.' 09 Referendum backers were
concerned about a transportation policy they believed inevitably led to a cycle of
increasing reliance on cars--single occupancy vehicle use had increased significantly in the
state--with the attendant problems of increasing air pollution and energy use and
detrimental impacts on the quality of life. They were concerned that the focus on building
or expanding roads encourages sprawl, and that, as people settle in increasingly remote
areas, they become increasingly reliant on their cars." Increasingly diffuse settlement
patterns and reliance on cars, in turn, leads to the demise of village centers, making it
necessary for even more people to travel for goods and services no longer available in
local villages, and leading to demands for bigger and better roads to handle the increased
traffic, and so forth. They were also concerned that the emphasis on auto use ignored the
transportation needs of the elderly, disabled, poor, young and others unable to drive."1
Business interests: The business community opposed the referendum because they
considered the addition to the turnpike necessary. The adequacy of highway infrastructure
is considered fundamental to the state's economic interests, as 80 percent of all traffic in
the state is over roads and highways.1 2 Even businesses in the northern part of state that
do not themselves travel the turnpike depend on the efficient flow of goods through
southern Maine. And businesses dependent on tourism asked whether the state wanted to
send a message to tourists that it did not care about seeing them stuck for hours in traffic.
As it was, the stretch of turnpike sparking the debate was a bottleneck between two wider
10sBogdonofl Op. Cit.
' Bogdonoff. Op. Cit.
"" Nagusky, pers. com., December 1996.
"' Nagusky, pers. com., December 1996.
112 Dana Connors, currently head of the Maine Chamber of Commerce (former head of MDOT), pers.
com., December 1996.
stretches of road, and the business community believed engineering studies and traffic
projections had established that another lane was necessary." 3 Furthermore, because the
proposal to widen the turnpike had already passed review by the state Department of
Environmental Protection by the time the referendum campaign got underway, the
business community argued that the additional lane had met necessary environmental
standards.14
The Maine Better Transportation Association was one of the business groups deeply
involved in the campaign, working hard to defeat the referendum. The association
advocates for transportation funding on behalf of highway users, primarily, including
truckers, highway contractors, and municipalities. Although the association cared most
about seeing a new lane added to the turnpike, during the referendum campaign, it focused
its criticism on the issue of transportation policy, believing that was the most vulnerable
part of the referendum."' In actuality, it was not as opposed to the planning elements
contained in the referendum as its campaign strategy suggested. Some business interests
were concerned, though, that scarce state resources not be "consumed in endless
planning."" 6
Maine transportation agencies: The Maine Department of Transportation (MDOT) has
overall responsibility for statewide transportation policy and planning.' 1 7 Although it was
a proposal by the MTA to widen a road that spurred the referendum effort, MDOT's
transportation planning policy became the chief focus of the initiative campaign to enact
the "Sensible Transportation Policy Act." MDOT opposed the referendum because it
thought the proposed widening of the turnpike was necessary, and believed that the policy
requirements of the referendum would be costly and ineffective, burdening the department
"3 Maria Fuentes, Maine Better Transportation Association, pers. com., December 1996.
"4 Fuentes, pers. com.
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116 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 155.
"7 Rule for the Sensible Transportation Policy Act, Feb. 1, 1993, p. 5.
with unnecessary red tape.' At the time, new federal requirements for state
transportation agencies were being formulated under the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), and MDOT viewed the referendum as yet another
layer of even stronger requirements with which it would have to contend.'' 9 The
department staff saw the referendum as a directive coming from outside the agency, from
people who did not understand the constraints and requirements under which the
department operated, essentially telling the highway engineers how to do their jobs.120
Going into the negotiations after the department had "lost" the referendum battle, the
commissioner's paramount concern was to begin healing the rifts that had occurred.1 2 1
Maine has a small population, and the acrimony of the referendum debate had been
wearing on all sides. 2 2 He was also concerned about restoring morale within the agency,
which was low after a year and a half of being the focus of this bitter campaign, and
passage of the referendum.12 1 MDOT staff were interested in being able to communicate
the restrictions under which it operated and to ensure the rule that was developed was
workable, 2 4 as well as achieving a result that would satisfy the various interest groups.
The process
Having decided to try negotiated rulemaking, MDOT advertised a request for proposals
from dispute resolution facilitators in Maine newspapers. It received 60 to 70 responses
from Maine and other New England states. A review committee of MIDOT staff
eventually narrowed the choices down to a single team, which they recommended to the
commissioner. The commissioner talked to NRCM to get their response to the choice."12
118 Connors, pers. com.; Reeves, pers. com.
119 Connors, pers. com., December 1996.
120 Reeves, pers. com., December 1996.
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The staff was seeking facilitators who could work with a wide range of people, and
selected the team of Ann Gosline and Jonathan Reitman, lawyers with dispute resolution
practices in the state. Part of what the selection committee was seeking, and liked about
this team, was their difference from the male-dominated, engineering culture of MDOT.
Gosline's presence, in particular, was viewed at first with some skepticism by some of the
traditional people in the transportation community.126 But the selection of this team made
the referendum backers very comfortable, because they recognized that Gosline and
Reitman were not MDOT insiders. The agency's chief counsel, who was involved in the
selection process, as well as serving as the agency's chief negotiator, believes the two
gained the confidence of the skeptics over a short period of time.127
The facilitators were hired in February, 1992, and over the next two months conducted
prenegotiation interviews to assess the conflict and determine who should be involved, and
convened a 61-member negotiated rulemaking committee. 8 The committee, which
became known as the Transportation Policy Advisory Committee (T-PAC), included
representatives of MDOT, MTA, and NRCM, of course, as well as representatives of
Maine Better Transportation Association, Campaign for Sensible Transportation,
American Automobile Association, Associated General Contractors, Maine Chamber of
Commerce, Maine Council of Senior Citizens, Conservation Law Foundation, Economic
Development Council of Maine, Maine Real Estate and Economic Development
Association and others.
At the committee's first meeting, in April 1992, Commissioner Connors established
several groundrules: The committee had to be have its draft rule completed by September,
so that he could meet the December 15, 1992, deadline established by the law, taking into
account a period for public comment. He also specified that agreement on the rule had to
126 Reeves, pers. com.
127 Reeves, pers. com.
128 Reitman and Gosline, Op. Cit.
be by consensus (that is, unanimity), and that the rule had to be viewed as workable by
the department.1 2 9
The facilitators suggested some other groundrules, including a two-tiered structure to
allow the large committee function effectively: the full committee would participate in
discussions and a smaller steering committee would be responsible for reaching consensus
and oversee the drafting of the rule. The facilitators proposed 20 participants to form the
steering committee." 0 Referendum backers questioned the composition of the proposed
steering committee, which seemed to them unbalanced against their side. Eventually the
group agreed to add three more members representing the referendum backer's point of
view. 131
Other groundrules included a "pledge to approach the discussions in good faith and with
the goal of reaching consensus on a rule [and] agree[ing] to listen to each others' concerns
and consider other members' suggestions in good faith." In addition, to promote the
"free and open exchange of ideas, views, and information prior to achieving consensus,"
members also agreed that "specific offers, positions, or statements made during T-PAC
discussions will not be used by other members for any purpose outside the discussions or
as the basis for future litigation."13 2
Once the protocols and general structure of the group were settled, the committee
recognized the need for a shared base of information. A subcommittee worked with the
facilitators to organize two all-day information sessions. At the start of the first session,
the facilitators enlisted the assistance of one of the participants to lead the group in an "ice
breaking" exercise. It helped ease tensions and helped members who had been opponents
in the referendum campaign to discover areas of common ground.13 3 The information
129 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit.
44 Bogdonoff Op. Cit. p. 156.
" Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 156.
132 Transportation Policy Advisory Committee, "Goal and Protocol," p. 4.
133 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 156.
sessions provided the opportunity for MDOT to explain the many regulatory, fimding, and
other constraints under which it operated. Others participants provided information on
alternative transportation management strategies from other jurisdictions, and possible
models for demand management from other sectors. The shared information proved
helpful as talks progressed.13 4
The negotiating process was arduous.'13  Considerable time was required to agree on how
to actually tackle the issues. After the two information sessions, the facilitators asked
members to write out their visions of the transportation rule. 13 6 The environmentalists,
business group and agency produced extremely different ideas. These were put together
to see where any common ground existed, and to develop a list of goals. The facilitators'
suggestion to break into subcommittees to tackle different issues was rejected by the
environmentalists, who feared being "outnumbered and outvoted." 3 7 The group tried
breaking into subgroups based on shared views on the issues. Still, attempts to translate
the goals developed by these "affinity groups" into acceptable rule language failed. The
facilitators consulted with Harter, who suggested the facilitators draft a framework
document to use as a basis. That idea was rejected by those who thought it would stifle
full consideration of all views.' 3 8 Finally, the three affinity groups that had evolved over
several meetings, representing environmental, business, and agency interests, each
nominated a couple representatives to form a drafting committee.
The drafting committee hammered out proposed language, in some cases negotiating ever
word. The facilitators circulated drafts to the full group for feedback, but as the deadline
loomed and the drafting committee's task became increasingly time consuming, keeping
the full committee informed and involved was increasingly difficult. 139 The drafting
committee members faced the challenge of negotiating the language of the rule while
134 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 156.
"3 Reitman and Gosline, Op. Cit; Reeves, pers. com..
136 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 157.
17 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 157.
1" Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 157.
139 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 159.
remaining true to their own constituents, reporting back to their constituents, and at times
working to convince their constituents to agree to draft language.140
Six months after the committee began, it reached consensus on a 30-page draft rule.
MDOT ushered the draft through the state's notice and comment procedures. The
commissioner "traveled around the state explaining the rules and inviting comments. He
outlined to the public the basis of the rules and explained that they were not self-
executing. Their success relied on the involvement of the public."' Very few comments
were received, and rule was adopted essentially unchanged.14 2
Following through, carrying on
With input form T-PAC members and assistance from Gosline and Reitman, the agency
created eight planning regions, outside areas with existing metropolitan planning
organizations (MPOs), as called for in the new rule. The structure for regional
transportation advisory committees (RTACs) was developed, modeled after T-PAC, and
when Commissioner Connors asked for volunteers to serve on the regional committees,
500 people responded.4 3 The RTACs met for the first time in December 1993, and in
their first year produced twenty-year plans for their regions.14 4 Commissioner Connors
(who is no longer with the agency) says that the regional committees have become the
department's eyes and ears."4
During the previous legislative session the department convened chairs of all the RTACs,
representatives of the MPOs, as well as some members of the original T-PAC such as
NRCM and the Maine Better Transportation Association, to make some adjustments to
the rule. This was done in part to forestall suggestions in the legislature to repeal the
140 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 159.
141 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p 161.
142 Reitman and Gosline, Op. Cit. p. 8.
'3 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit. p. 162.
144 Jane Lincoln, pers. com., December 1996.
"5 Dana Connors, pers. com., December 1996.
act.146 (The deputy commissioner described the changes as clarifications more than
substantial changes.14 7 ) More recently, in the last session of the state legislature, the issue
resurfaced when a couple conservative Republicans pushed a bill to repeal the act. The
Maine Better Transportation Association, which had fiercely opposed the original
referendum, joined forces with NRCM to fight the repeal, and the repeal effort was
defeated. A representative of the business group explained that her group had bought into
the process and the result of the negotiated rulemaking effort."4 Connors considers the
repeal attempt a test of the rule that would have been a great opportunity to derail the
endeavor if it did not have support. 14 9
Discussion
The underlying Issues. Referendum backers raised the issue of fairness, although perhaps
not explicitly, both in terms of participation norms and in terms of the distribution of costs
and benefits of state transportation planning decisions. Referendum supporters objected
to the lack of opportunity citizens had to participate in transportation decisions affecting
them, and pointed out that MDOT's focus on highway construction and maintenance
failed to address the transportation needs of (or provide transportation benefits to)
nondrivers. On the other hand, demands that MDOT pay better attention to local and
regional planning goals suggested that some communities had borne unfair costs as a
result of state transportation decisions
The referendum backers also questioned the technical assumptions of the department,
suggesting that its proposed engineering solution would ultimately feed the state's
increasing dependence on cars, leading more quickly than necessary to demands for more
roads. Clearly, those who supported turnpike expansion and those who opposed it were
framing the issue differently, a not uncommon occurrence when scientific or technical
evidence is in dispute. Business interests and the agency believed they had sufficient
'
46 Maria Fuentes, pers. com., December 1996.
' Jane Lincoln, pers. com., December 1996.
148 Fuentes, pers. com., December 1996.
149 Connors, pers. com., December 1996.
evidence, in terms of engineering studies and traffic projections, to establish the need for
and feasibility of widening the turnpike for a stretch of 30 miles. The opponents of
turnpike expansion objected to the way the problem was framed, arguing that the
congestion was part of a wider problem and needed a wider approach to a solution. For
its part, during the campaign MDOT disputed the effectiveness or feasibility of the
approach embodied in the referendum.
The issue of costs was certainly exploited in the referendum campaign. For instance, an
ad produced by referendum supporters suggested that state funds were being diverted
from other roads and highways to "gold-plate the turnpike," a characterization of
appropriation and funding mechanisms that referendum opponents disputed. Referendum
opponents raised the idea that passage of the referendum would have adverse economic
impacts, sending the wrong message to tourists and hampering the flow of goods through
the southern part of the state. MDOT was concerned about costs as well as red tape the
referendum would impose on the agency (in a turnabout from the usual complaints raised
to dispute agency regulations because of the costs they impose).
Elements of the rule. The Sensible Transportation Policy Act Rule establishes policy
objectives that include coordination and efficient use of all modes of transportation, and
consideration of environmental and land use impacts, as well as economic impacts, in
transportation decision making. It provides a framework for developing a statewide
transportation plan to be used as MDOT's basic planning document.
The rule...
* directs MDOT to establish regional transportation advisory committees (RTACs).
These regional entities, along with existing metropolitan planning organizations, will
provide MDOT with better understanding of regional concerns and priorities, facilitate
public participation in transportation planning, and provide input to the statewide
transportation plan;
0 stipulates components of the statewide plan, including identification of transportation
needs, consideration of current and forecasted deficiencies, and an outline of strategies to
address them, evaluation of transportation demand management techniques, and
implementation of current and emerging technological innovations;
* establishes a deadline of for completion of the initial statewide plan (January 1, 1995)
and a schedule for updating it (every five years);
e directs MDOT, in cooperation with existing metropolitan planning organizations and
RTACs, to develop and maintain an inventory that describes characteristics, usage and
conditions of existing transportation systems in the state.'
Was it successful? The committee produced a rule that all could accept and produced it
on time. Moreover, if, as Susskind, et al. argue, parties involved in a mediation effort
should be the ones to determine its effectiveness, 151 this one was an outstanding success.
Former Commissioner Connors, for one, remains an enthusiastic supporter of what the
committee accomplished. Connors hoped, going into the process, to get some healing
from it, and believes he got much more, because the process worked. It produced a rule
that all parties involved in the process support, as well as contributing to healing and
reconciliation. He considers this rulemaking effort, if not quite a show case, then at least a
measure for others of what is possible. He believes the results speak to the fimdamental
importance of attending not just to what you do but how you do it.1s 2
The commissioner noted that although he has the highest regard for his department, and
believes it is second to none, he could not have hoped for better results than T-PAC
accomplished. For, whatever rule the department produced on its own, the rule would not
have the same "buy-in," the same sense of ownership this process provided. The process
also allowed the agency staff to show their competence and expertise, during the
information sessions and over the course of the negotiations, something that the
150 Rule for the Sensible Transportation Policy Act, Maine Department of Transportation, Feb. 1, 1993.
151 Susskind and Cruikshank, Op. Cit., pp. 24-33; and Susskind and McMahon, Op. Cit., pp. 140-141.
152 Connors, pers. com., December 1996.
commissioner had originally thought could be accomplished only by having the department
produce the rule on its own."'
The commissioner is not alone in his evaluation. Beth Nagusky of the NRCM believes it
was a "tremendous success." 154 And, as noted earlier, one of the key business groups
involved, the Maine Better Transportation Association, went to bat along with NRCM to
stop an effort by a few legislators to repeal the act,,15 putting their support into action.
In terms of efficiency, the committee met the deadline for the rule. It is clear that the
process required a great deal of hard work and commitment from all participants, but in
particular, toward the end, from the drafting committee. In terms of fairness, it appears
that all the key stakeholders were represented in the process. Tom Reeves, the MDOT
chief counsel, who was the departments lead negotiator, believes the facilitators did an
outstanding job of convening the committee, and that careful attention in the early phases
of the project helped ensure success. In terms of stability, the rule has thus far withstood a
challenge from a few state legislators. However, Reeves notes that there are many
organized interests vested in the traditional transportation system, and so believes that
future efforts to derail the act will occur.156 On the other hand, a group of T-PAC and
RTAC representatives have already been reconvened to make some changes. It appears
that the changes were minor, however, and so far the substance of the rule is holding.
Time will tell how effective the rule is in curbing the growth of single-occupancy vehicle
use and otherwise managing transportation demand. The continuing success of the rule
also depends on the continuing commitment and effectiveness of volunteer regional
organizations, the RTACs. For the present, the department has in hand a tool it has not
had before, a 20-year statewide transportation plan developed by the different regions in
the state, to guide its planning decision.
153 Connors, pers. com., December 1996.
' Nagusky, pers. com., December 1996.
155 Fuentes, pers. com., December 1996.
156 Reeves, pers. com., December 1996.
The process had a very positive affect on relationships. Bogdonoff makes the following
observations:
e "People sat across from former 'enemies' and not only gained mutual respect,
developed admiration and even affection for one another.
* "At numerous points one individual came up with the knowledge, trust, or
perseverance to move the group forward. Several participants noted 'how they never
knew where the next good idea would come from.'
* "The amount of plain work...became another cause for mutual respect and trust group
members ultimately had for each other." 57
Nagusky cautions, however, that improved relations may be less an asset than it seems for
environmentalists, because it may make it harder for environmentalists to stand up for
what they are fighting for, when that, rather than cooperation or "going along, is
necessary.158
Former Commissioner Connors attributes the success of the process to two key factors:
" the people who were involved wanted it to work; and
" the invaluable contribution of the facilitators. They provided not only highly
constructive input throughout, but got the right representation on the committee and were
central in making the whole thing work out. "Both are incredibly talented."' 59 Others
have stressed the value of the facilitators, as well. It was noted, for example, that Gosline
was on the phone all the time, checking in with people, floating ideas, reminding
negotiators to check back with their constituents.16 0
Others believe it was the commitment of the commissioner himself that made the process
work.' Once he committed to using negotiated rulemaking, he clearly put his full
157 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit., pp. 160-161.
158 Nagusky, pers. com.
159 Connors, pers. com., December 1996.
16 Fuentes, pers. com., December 1996.
161 Fuentes, pers. com., December 1996.
support behind it. He instructed his staff to "make it work."16 2 As the negotiating
committee did its work, he did not interfere, although his commitment to the process was
apparently clear. As noted, during the notice and comment period he traveled around the
state explaining the draft rule and soliciting comment. His support carried through to the
establishment of the regional committees and included adding several staff members to
work with them. 163
Shortcomings. There were not many shortcomings of the process. The insecurity of
referendum supporters is evident from their opposition to breaking up into small groups
and being reluctant to try some of the suggested approaches to writing the rule. I assume
that the insecurity stems from having only a few participants in the group with significant
skills in negotiation or other group interactions, and the inexperienced members were
unwilling to break up in small groups where there would be less support at hand. It may
have been helpful, therefore, for the facilitators to provide a training session in negotiated
rulemaking, before the talks got underway. I am unaware of one having been conducted.
On the other hand, given the thoroughness with which these facilitators tackled their
work, it is likely that the participants were given a clear idea of the process and what to
expect when the committee was being convened.
So far this case appears to be a clear success. The value of negotiated rulemaking is in the
process, that develops a sense of ownership in those who participate, as well as in the
substance of the rule, which draws on the expertise and information of all interests that
will be affected by the rule. The strength of commitment to a rule, however, cannot be
completely measured until it is tested. So far this case has met the test.
162 Reeves, pers. com., December 1996.
163 Bogdonoff, Op. Cit.
4. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING:
CONDITIONS, PROCEDURES AND CAVEATS
This chapter provides an overview of negotiated rulemaking, the process used in the three
examples described in the previous chapter. Although the focus of this thesis is on the use
of negotiated rulemaking by state agencies, the idea of negotiated rulemaking developed in
response to the shortcomings of traditional rulemaking procedures at the federal level.
This overview draws extensively from the literature on negotiated rulemaking, which is
based on federal experience.
Proponents predict that if used appropriately, regulatory negotiations can improve the
factual basis of agency regulations, produce more practical regulations by providing the
agency with a better understanding of the concerns of affected interests, reduce the time
and costs of developing regulations, increase a rule's legitimacy, making it easier for the
agency to implement and improving compliance, and reduce the likelihood that a
regulation will be challenged in court.' Although state agencies fice regulatory challenges
that are in many ways comparable to those of federal agencies, regulations at the state
level are less likely to be challenged in court. Rather than seeking judicial review, an
interest group is more likely to contest a regulation through political means.2 Thus,
reduction in the rate at which regulations are litigated is not as useful a measure of the
effectiveness of state agency regulatory negotiations as it may be for federal agencies.
However, other objectives motivating federal agencies to try regulatory negotiations apply
at the state level, and attempts by stakeholders to contest a rule by way of the legislature
or the governor need to be considered, in addition to legal challenges.
The chapter focuses primarily on the prenegotiation phase and procedural elements
because they are considered by practitioners to be key to the appropriate use and ultimate
1 Philip J. Harter, "Negotiated Regulations: A Cure for Malaise," Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 71:1,
1982.
2 ACUS, Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1995, p. 369.
success of regulatory negotiation. A summary of federal negotiated rulemaking activity is
also included. The chapter concludes by addressing some criticisms of the process.
BACKGROUND
The idea of negotiation regulations developed in the 1970s and early 1980s in response to
the inadequacy of the traditional rulemaking process for dealing with complex, multi-party
issues. At the same time the shortcomings of traditional administrative procedures were
prompting calls for regulatory reform, environmental mediation and other consensual,
negotiated processes were proving successful in settling a range of public disputes.3 A
number of federal agencies -- in particular the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS), the Department of Labor, and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) -- and the academic community began to explore and refine the idea of negotiating
regulations.4
In 1982, Philip J. Harter, who had investigated the idea on behalf of the ACUS,
published a comprehensive and defining analysis of the prospects for negotiated
rulemaking. He argued that negotiation has distinct advantages, in appropriate situations,
over the adversarial procedures typical of traditional rulemaking, and proposed criteria for
evaluating whether negotiated rulemaking was appropriate for the rule under
consideration.6 The ACUS issued Recommendation 82-4 that year as well, encouraging
agencies to consider using negotiated rulemaking and providing guidelines for doing so.7
3 Harter, Op. Cit.; Nancy J. Baldwin, "Negotiated Rulemaking: A Case Study of Administrative Reform,"
unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT, 1983, pp. 16-21.
4 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., "Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Development of Negotiated
Rulemaking and Other Processes," Pepperdine Law Review, Vol. 14:863, 1987, pp. 867-874.
5 The ACUS was an independent agency established in 1964 to "promote improvements in the efficiency,
adequacy and fairness of procedures by which federal agencies conduct regulatory programs, administer
grants and benefits, and perform related governmental functions." (Negotiated Rulemaking Soucebook,
1995.) Funding for the agency was not renewed in the 1995-96 budget, and the agency closed October 31,
1995.
6 Harter, Op. Cit. Analogous negotiated processes surveyed by Harter include consensus standards,
settlements, public law remediation, the National Coal Project, dialogue groups and environmental
negotiations (pp. 32-42).
7 Recommendation 82-4, 1 CFR S.305.82-4, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations; reprinted
in, 1995, p. 11. The recommendation was drafted by Harter (Perritt, Ibid., p. 873-874).
KEY FEATURES
The idea of negotiated rulemaking is to bring together representatives of the agency and
all the significantly affected interests, at the beginning of the rulemaking process, to
negotiate the text of a proposed rule. Participants evaluate their own priorities and make
trade offs to achieve outcomes on issues that are most important to them.8 Employing the
concepts of "principled negotiation" articulated by Fisher and Ury in Getting to Yes,
negotiators seek to discover and address the interests that underlie positions, invent
options for mutual gain, and identify and agree upon objective criteria with which to
evaluate options.9 Emphasis is placed joint problem solving. The committee of
negotiators is assisted by one or more neutrals who have experience as dispute resolution
mediators or facilitators,10 and the agency participates as a one of the negotiators. The
goal of the negotiated rulemaking committee is to reach consensus on a draft rule. If
consensus is reached, the agency publishes a draft rule based on that consensus."
Pre-negotiation
Because negotiated rulemaking is not appropriate or feasible for all regulations, a pre-
negotiation conflict assessment is also an integral feature of the process. A convener, who
generally is contracted from outside the agency or is a staff member not directly involved
in the substantive issues of the proposed rule,' 2 conducts the assessment to identify
stakeholders and key issues.'3 A convener who is not directly involved in the regulatory
program is expected to have better chances of encouraging stakeholders to be frank about
their concerns and interests. At the same time the convener is learning about the issues
and key concerns from various stakeholders, she explains the idea of negotiated
rulemaking and explores the willingness of the stakeholders to participate in such a
* Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook p. 1.
9 Roger Fisher and William Ury, and for the second edition, Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes, Penguin Books,(1981, 1991); pp.10-12; Harter, Negotiating Regulations, Op. Cit., pp. 86-88.
'
0 ACUS, Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1995; p. 8.
" ACUS, Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1995, pp. 7-8.
12 The Texas case deviated from recommended procedures, as the representative of the lead agency, the
GLO, convened the committee and also was one of the negotiators. Fortunately, the group's progress in
negotiating an agreement appears not to have been handicapped by this fact.
" Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1995, p. 7; Susan Carpenter and W. J. D. Kennedy, Managing
Public Disputes (Jossey-Bass, S.F.), 1988, pp. 71-91.
process. The convener reports to the agency, which decides whether or not to proceed.
The following conditions are considered by many practitioners to be critical to the success
of a negotiated rulemaking process. The convener seeks to determine if these conditions
exist, and the agency weighs that information and the convener's recommendation in its
determination to proceed or not.14
" A limited number of identifiable interests will be significantly affected by the rule.
" Negotiations will not require participants to compromise a fundamental value.
" The rule involves a number of issues that parties value differently. The existence of
issues that are valued differently allows parties to package issues and make trades to meet
different priorities. To achieve mutual gains, parties yield on issues they care less about to
achieve gains on issues they care more about."
* The agency is willing to commit sufficient resources, including technical assistance, to
the negotiated rulemaking committee, and to assign a senior manager to participate in the
negotiations.
* Parties view participation in the negotiations as in their best interests. Accordingly,
the agency needs to give the negotiators a clear idea of its probable course of action
should a negotiated rule not be achieved.16 In addition, participation should be voluntary.
A party required to participate may not do so in good faith,17 and a party that believes it
can do better by pursuing another course of action should be expected to do so.1 8
Throughout the negotiation, participants evaluate the extent to which their interests are
being met against what Fisher and Ury term the negotiator's "BATNA" -- their best
alternative to a negotiated agreement.19 The freedom of any participant to walk away
from the table encourages all the negotiators to seek solutions that will address the
concerns of all represented interests and helps ensure that the less powerful interests--who
14 ACUS, Recommendation 82-4, 1 CFR S.305.82-4, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations;
Recommendation 4 (a)-(g).
" Susskind and Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse, pp. 120-122.
16 ACUS Recommendation 85-5, 1 CFR S.305.85-5, Recommendation 2.
" Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, p. 39.
1 Harter (1982), p. 43.
19 Fisher and Ury, p. 100.
nevertheless may have enough power to block implementation of an agreement--will not
be ignored."
* No one interest dominates the negotiation. "All participants must feel that their
concurrence in any agreement is essential."" Although power among members of a
negotiating committee is likely to be somewhat uneven, it has been noted that power is not
static and derives from numerous sources. Negotiating skill, good ideas, and moral
authority, for example, can be important sources of power that can alter bargaining
dynamics from that which might be predicted. Fisher and Ury also advise that parties
can work to develop and improve their BATNAs as a means to help balance power in
negotiations."
* The agency is committed, to the maximum extent consistent with its legal obligations,
to use the consensus of the committee as the basis for the rule proposed by the agency for
notice and comment. If the agency expects parties to negotiate in good faith, taking
risks and making concessions--not to mention expending considerable time and other
resources--in an effort to achieve a mutually acceptable rule, the agency should make a
good faith commitment to propose the consensus rule developed by the committee. This
does not mean the agency abrogates its legal authority. The agency is represented in the
negotiations, and for consensus to emerge, the agency's negotiator must find the rule
acceptable. Moreover, the qualification to support the negotiated rule "to the extent
possible consistent with its legal obligations" provides agency flexibility and helps
underscore that the agency has not delegated its administrative authority to the committee.
If, after considering the findings and recommendations of the convener with respect to the
factors listed above, the agency decides to proceed with a negotiated process, it may
20 Fisher and Ury, p. 106.
21 Negotiating Rulemaking Sourcebook, p.40.
2 Susskind and McMahon, "The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking," pp. 153-155; Roger
Fisher, "Negotiation Power," American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 27, 1983, p. 153. Fisher proposes six
kinds of power useful in negotiations: "1) the power of skill and knowledge; 2) the power of a good
relationship; 3) the power of a good alternative to negotiating,; 4) the power of an elegant solution; 5) the
power of legitimacy; and 6) the power of commitment.
23 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes, Penguin Books, 1991, pp. 102-106.
24 Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Public Law 101-648, as amended by Public Law 102-342, 5 U.S.C.
S.563(a).
publish a notice of its intention to convene a negotiated rulemaking committee. This step
is required of federal agencies by the federal Negotiated Rulemaking Act, though
requirements for state agencies may vary.25 The notice describes the subject and scope of
the rule to be developed and lists the interests likely to be significantly affected and the
persons proposed to represent those interests. One purpose of the notice is to discover
any affected interests that were inadvertently overlooked during the convening process.
The notice solicits comments on the proposal and provides information on how persons
can apply to be on the committee if they will be significantly affected and believe their
interests will not be adequately represented by a person listed in the notice.26
Before actual negotiations begin a facilitator is selected. This may be the convener, who
has had the opportunity to learn about interests and issues and establish her credibility with
committee members, but it need not be. In the cases of both Ohio and Maine discussed in
the previous chapter, for example, the persons who convened the negotiating committees
also facilitated the negotiations. Whoever is selected to facilitate must be skilled in dispute
resolution techniques, and all members of the committee need to have confidence in the
facilitator's neutrality and skill in guiding the process." As was the case in two of the
state examples, sometimes a team of facilitators is used.
Because negotiated rulemaking participants often have extremely diverse levels of
experience as negotiators, the facilitator or someone else with appropriate expertise may
conduct a training session before negotiations begin. In the Texas negotiated
rulemaking, for example, the University of Texas Law School Center for Public Policy
Dispute Resolution provided training for the participants.2 9 Sessions usually include talks
on negotiation techniques and simulation exercises; a typical federal agency session runs 4-
2 5 U.S.C. S.564(a).26 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, p. 129.2 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, pp. 129-130.28 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, p. 193.
29 9 TexReg 6526, August 19, 1994.
6 hours. Although a single training session will not change a novice into an expert,
training sessions have proven helpful to individuals and the group as a whole.3 0
The negotiating committee's first order of business is to establish groundrules, the internal
protocols that will govern the negotiations. Groundrules usually include a commitment by
members to negotiate in good faith, how consensus will be defined (for example, will it
mean unanimity, general concurrence, or something else) and whether the negotiators will
be expected to sign a statement of their support of the consensus rule, if one is reached.
Groundrules also usually cover interactions with news media, the use of subcommittees,
and the decision of whether the committee will be crafting the actual language of a rule or
developing general principles and ideas that the agency will shape into a rule for the
committee's approval." For example, the Maine groundrules included the two-tiered
structure that allowed the large committee to work effectively, a media strategy (full
committee meetings were open to the media and the smaller subcommittee doing the
actual drafting would be off limits)," and the commitment of participants to respect the
pace of each member of the committee, among other protocols. 3 3 In addition to
groundrules established by the Maine negotiating committee as a whole, the Commissioner
of MDOT set the deadline, stipulated that consensus had to be unanimous, and specified
that the agency must view the rule as workable.
Negotiation and implementation
The attention and effort that goes into the prenegotiation stage--to identify all affected
interests and have those interests represented on the rulemaking committee; to assure that
a negotiated process is appropriate for the rule in question; to jointly develop protocols by
which the committee will operate--along with the assistance of a facilitator or mediator
skilled in dispute resolution, help set the stage for joint problem solving and thus increase
3 0 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, pp. 194-195.
3' Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, pp. 210-213; Harter, "Negotiating Regulations," Op.Cit., pp. 92-
97; Susskind and Cruikshank, pp.108-111.
32 Reitman and Gosline, p.8.
" Bogdonoff, p. 156.
34 Bogdonoff, p. 155.
the chances that frequently disputed issues such as the costs, fairness, and the scientific
basis of the proposed regulations can be addressed and resolved.
An important concept of principled negotiation is to "attack... the problem, not each
other."" The shift in focus away from each other and toward the problem, in the context
of rulemaking, implies that all parties strive to resolve a mutually shared problem, rather
than pitching their arguments to the agency and waiting for the agency to, in effect, pick
the winners and losers. Negotiations include opportunities for brainstorming, sessions
explicitly devoted to "inventing options" without judging them, committing to them, or
being held to them, for the purpose of discovering what possibilities may exist.36 And
because parties value different factors and issues differently, negotiators seek, with
creativity and hard work, to craft a regulation that meets the interests of the different
stakeholders.
The scientific basis of the rule can be examined and debated to produce a sounder, more
feasible rule than would be produced in an adversarial context by the agency alone. The
effort made during the convening stage to involve all relevant interests increases the
chances that all relevant factual information will be considered." EPA has found, for
example, that for rules involving complex technical issues, negotiated rulemaking has
proven effective in "bring[ing] to the table as much technical information as possible.""
The facilitated consensus process is more conducive to information sharing than the
traditional adversarial process. 39 Representatives of different interests bring to the table
information they consider important, and have the opportunity to discuss directly with
others questions pertaining to the uncertainty or interpretation of scientific data. Given
that the goal of the negotiations is to reach a mutually acceptable regulation, participants
* Fisher, Ury, and Patton, p. 11.36 Fisher, Ury, and Patton, pp. 57-63; Harter, pp. 88-89.
3 Harter, pp. 29-31 and 89-90.38 Thomas, Lee M., "The Successful Use of Regulatory Negotiation by EPA," Administrative Law News,
Fall 1987.
39 Lawrence Susskind and Connie P. Ozawa, "Mediating Science-Intensive Policy Disputes," Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1985) pp. 32-33; Harter, p. 90.
have less incentive to conceal pertinent facts and use information as a weapon than there
sometimes is in adversarial proceedings, and, in fact, a committee's groundrules may
stipulate that data not be concealed from the other sides.40
The facilitator can be instrumental in ensuring that scientific and technical information is
presented so that all participants understand it and that all participants have access to
technical assistance. The facilitator also is in a position to challenge and clarify misleading
41or ambiguous statements.
In addition to the information that each negotiator brings to the table, the group may
identify gaps in the information base and undertake common research to address questions
that stand in the way of consensus.42 Joint fact finding can be used to resolve disputed
facts and test the distributional impacts of different options. For example, an EPA-
sponsored negotiated rulemaking in 1984, to establish the penalties for manufacturers of
heavy equipment vehicles or engines not in compliance with Clean Air Act standards,
involved the development of a spreadsheet model that allowed negotiators to test the
impact of changes to various parameters. 43 This negotiating committee also used funds in
a common resource pool created by EPA for a study of a proposed program to test
engines."
None of the state cases I looked at undertook anything like the engine testing research
undertaken by the EPA committee. Although I looked at only three cases, states agencies
in general may reasonably be expected to rely more on existing data rather than to
commission their own research. State agencies' resources are more limited and their
44 According to Harter, the National Coal Policy Project (one of the public policy negotiation projects
undertaken in the 1970s) drew upon Milton R. Wessel's "Rule of Reason" for its groundrules, which
begin with "data should not be withheld from the other side." Harter, Negotiating Regulations, Op. Cit.,
p. 83.
41 Susskind and Ozawa, pp. 34-35.
42 Susskind and Ozawa, pp. 33-34; Susskind and Cruikshank, pp.113-117; Harter, pp. 89-91;
Sourcebook, p. 270.
43 Susskind and McMahon, pp. 145, 161.
44Susskind and McMahon, pp. 145, 161.
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regulatory mandates are more limited than those of the EPA, whose standards affect the
whole country.
Participants in each of the three state cases profiled brought information as well as their
perspectives, insight, and interests to the table, which contributed to the development of
mutually acceptable rules. In Maine, participants recognized the need for a shared
information base and scheduled several information sessions in which participants made
presentations to the group. 45 In Texas, the participating agencies had technical experts at
the table and the industry negotiators occasionally brought in their technical experts to talk
with the group. 6 In Ohio, members of the regulated community introduced important
new information that otherwise would not have been considered. The Ohio committee's
failure to agree on the interpretation and policy implications of the new information
suggests that the group would probably have benefited from joint fact finding to resolve
the disputed technical issues. Although they did not do that (possibly because the
information was introduced late in the negotiations), the overall legitimacy of the process
enabled the group to agree not to challenge regulations and allow commissioner to make
the final decision on the disputed issues.
Whether the negotiating committee hammers out the precise language of a rule together or
agrees to general concepts that the agency then translates into proposed language of the
rule, the committee reviews draft documents as they are developed to ensure the proposed
regulations reflect the committee's consensus. The rule agreed to by the negotiated
rulemaking committee is then proposed for noticed and comment by the agency, 4 7
according to the applicable (federal or state) administrative procedures requirements.
Because the process has sought to involve the key stakeholders in developing the rule,
comments are expected to be few and minor. The committee may or may not participate
in reviewing and responding to the comments, and making any changes to the proposed
45 Bogdonoff, p. 156.
46 Tom Reavley, personal communication, April 26, 1996.
4? Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, p. 8.
rule." At the federal level, the EPA usually disbands the negotiating committee at the
conclusion of formal negotiations, while the Department of Transportation maintains the
committee through the public comment period.49
Judging the result
The anticipated benefits of negotiated rulemaking suggest the criteria for evaluating the
result of a reg-neg. Compared to what could be expected from the traditional rulemaking
process, a regulatory negation should, in general, be expected to produce better
information upon which the rule is based, produce a rule that is more practical than what
the agency would be expected to produce on its own, provide the opportunity for affected
interests to participate meaningfully, improve the exchange of information, decrease the
length and cost of rulemaking, increase the legitimacy of the regulations, and reduce
subsequent litigation (or, in the case of state reg-negs other challenges to the proposed
rule).'" To fairly evaluate the outcome, the entire package of results need to be
considered; focusing on a single aspect may miss the bigger picture. The success of a
negotiated rulemaking effort also can be judged by the volume and tenor of comments
received when the proposed rule is published for comment, prior to promulgation of the
final rule.
FEDERAL ACTIVITY
As noted, interest in negotiating regulations had been building in the 1970s and early
1980s, spurred by shortcomings of the traditional rulemaking process and the success of
analogous negotiated processes. Following the recommendations of the ACUS in 1982,
federal agencies began to a undertake regulatory negotiations. The first federal agency to
use the process was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The FAA convened a
committee to negotiate flight and rest time requirements for pilots in 1983, after several
failed attempts in previous years to revise outmoded standards through traditional notice
and comment procedures. The committee's proposed rule was published in March 1984
48Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, p. 230-231.
49Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, p. 230-231.
50 Harter, Op. Cit.
102
and the final rule was promulgated the following year." In 1983 the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) convened a negotiated rulemaking committee to
develop a standard for occupational exposure to benzene. Although the committee was
unable to reach agreement on a proposed rule, the negotiations narrowed the issues in
dispute. The agency issued a proposed rule in 1985 and a final rule in 1987.2
In 1983 EPA launched its Regulatory Negotiation Project, undertaking seven negotiations
between 1984 and April 1987. Exit interviews with participants of the first two
negotiations, which EPA characterized as pilot projects," indicated the following:
[N]early all of the participants in the negotiations concluded that the
process worked better and yielded more acceptable regulations than they
might have expected under conventional rulemaking. In addition,
participants pointed to improved understanding of technical issues, fuller
appreciation of the institutional positions of the other parties, and an
awareness of the potential for negotiation as an alternative to standard
rulemaking. Both negotiations were completed on schedule, with results
that the Agency considered more than satisfactory.54
Rules developed by EPA using negotiated rulemaking include the following:
e nonconformance penalties for manufacturers of heavy equipment that is out of
compliance with the Clean Air Act;
* regulations governing emergency exemptions to pesticide regulations;
" performance standards for residential woodburning stoves;
" regulations to control volatile organic chemical equipment leaks;
" manifests for transporting hazardous wastes; and
5 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, p.9 , pp.383-384.
5 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, p. 382.
1 Daniel F. Fiorino, "Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process," Public Administration Review,
July/August 1988.
5 Fiorino and Kirz, pp. 29-30.
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* national emission standards for coke oven batteries."
In addition, the agency has based other rules on agreements that were achieved in
negotiations where the committee was unable to produce a consensus on the entire rule, 6
including worker protection standards for agricultural pesticides and rules on the
inspection and abatement of asbestos-containing materials in schools. The asbestos rule
was challenged in court by one of the groups that had been on the negotiating committee,
representing former manufacturers of asbestos building materials. The rule withstood the
challenge, and the agency believes the scope of the litigation was substantially narrowed
by the negotiations. 7 According to the ACUS, the EPA is the "most consistent and
committed" user of the process, accounting for approximately one third of federal agency
negotiated rulemaking activity. 8
In 1985 the ACUS issued a second recommendation reconfirming the advantages of
negotiated rulemaking for some rules.5' As more agencies used the process, a track
record developed;60 by 1990 eight federal departments and agencies had used negotiated
rulemaking and by 1995 thirteen had (Table 1).61 Congress demonstrated its support of
the process by passing the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.
THE NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACT OF 1990
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act was enacted to provide a framework for the conduct of
negotiated rulemaking and to encourage agencies to use the process in appropriate
ss Sourcebook, 1995, pp. 387-395; also Kathrin Day Lassila, "See You Later, Litigator," Amicus Journal,
Summer, 1992, pp. 5-6; and Lee M. Thomas, "The Successful Use of Regulatory Negotiation by EPA,"
Administrative Law News, Vol. 13, No. 1, Fall 1987, pp. 1, 3-4.
* Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1995; p. 9.
57 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1995, p. 390.
ss Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1995; p. 9.
s9 Recommendation 85-5, 1 CFR S.305.85-5.
** Statement of Senator Carl Levin before the House Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations on H.R. 3052, the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, August 10, 1988. Levin
sponsored S. 1504, the companion bill of H.R. 3052, in the Senate.
61 Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1990 and 1995 editions.
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Table 1. Federal agencies that have used negotiated rulemaking
Federal departments and agencies that had used negotiated rulemaking by 1990:
Dept. of Agriculture Dept. of Transportation
Dept. of Education Environmental Protection Agency
Dept. of Housing and Urban Development Federal Trade Commission
Dept. of Labor Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Federal departments and agencies that had used negotiated rulemaking by 1995,
in addition to those above:
Dept. of Health and Human Services Federal Communications Commission
Dept. of the Interior Interstate Commerce Commission
Farm Credit Administration
Source: Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook, 1990 and 1995 editions.
situations.62 It provides guidelines for agencies to determine if the process is appropriate
for the rule in question and outlines procedures for convening a committee and conducting
committee activities, and indicates how the process relates to, and conforms
with, requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and the notice and
comment requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. Although it was originally
set to expire in November 1996, it was permanently reauthorized in October 1996, under
provisions of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996.63
The reauthorization by Congress reflects support for regulatory negotiations that has
continued since the statute was enacted in 1990. In 1992, for example, McGarity's
62 Pub. L. No. 101-648, as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-354, Title 5, U.S. Code, S. 561, and by Pub. L.
104-320.
63 Public Law 104-320, Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996. Sec. 11. Reauthorization of
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990.
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discussion of the "ossification" of the rulemaking process includes regulatory negotiation
on a short list of "ossification avoidance devices." 64 While noting that the process is not
suitable for all regulations,65 nor a "magic cure for the ills of ossification," he concludes
that negotiated rulemaking is "a very useful tool that should be in every regulatory
agency's toolbox."66 A report of the Vice President's National Performance Review
published in 1993 encourages greater use of consensus-based approaches to regulation as
one of the ways to improve regulatory systems.67 In another 1993 report, "Risk and the
Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making," the Carnegie Commission on
Science, Technology, and Government includes regulatory negotiation on its list of
suggestions to improve rulemaking practices. "Join[ing] the many students of the subject
who advocate the use of [negotiated rulemaking]," the commission suggests that
"agencies ... attempt to negotiate rules where it is possible to do so without prejudicing
underrepresented third parties."6
NOT A CURE-ALL
While arguing the benefits of negotiated rulemaking in his 1982 essay, Harter stressed the
need to ensure the process was appropriate for the rule under consideration and the need
to avoid "the 'hot tub' view of negotiation [that] if only we strip off the armor of an
adversarial hearing, everyone will jump into negotiations with beguiling honesty and
openness to reach the optimum solution to the problem at hand."69 Not only is it
important to be sure that the process is appropriate, it is also critical for all participants to
be as prepared as possible. Although participants will be reminded and encouraged to
think in terms of finding a mutually acceptable agreement, it is expected that each
participant also will be pursuing his or her own interests as well.
" Thomas 0. McGarity, "Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Process," Duke Law Journal,
Vol. 41, No. 6, June 1992, pp. 1438-1440.
65 This is commonly acknowledged, as noted earlier, and the reason that a careful conflict assessment is
conducted prior to undertaking the process.
* McGarity, p. 1440.
6 7 National Performance Review: Improving Regulatory Systems, Accompanying Report of the National
Performance Review, Office of the Vice President, Washington, DC, September 1993, pp.29-33.
* Risk and the Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making, a report of the Carnegie
Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, June, 1993; p. 111.69 Harter, p. 31.
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Amy argues that negotiated rulemaking and other environmental mediation processes may
be misused to co-opt or diffuse opposition, or lull or pressure environmentalists into
accepting compromises that are against their interests. 0 He criticizes the tactic of
facilitators of encouraging negotiators to think about things differently, suggesting that the
result, if not the intention, may be that negotiators abandon their interests, rather than
gaining fresh insights or moving off their original positions. Because there will always be
differences in negotiating skill and experience, he worries that the process will perpetuate
and legitimate power imbalances. And, because the facilitator's job is to achieve
consensus, Amy argues they may be willing to ignore significant disparities in negotiating
power as they forge ahead to agreement.71 The concern is that weaker parties will get
trampled, under the guise of meaningful participation. These are important concerns, and
it is useful for environmentalists to approach with some skepticism any process embraced
by the corporate giants he lists as supporters of environmental mediation.
While skepticism may be a healthy approach to negotiations, one also must consider one's
options. If fundamental rights are at stake, proponents of negotiated rulemaking maintain
that the negotiating table is not the appropriate forum for resolution of the dispute. If a
negotiated process is undertaken, Fisher and Ury argue the need for all negotiators to be
as prepared as possible when they enter the process, and to assume that negotiators will be
pursuing their own interests in the talks. The value of preparing and having clear idea of
one's best alternatives to negotiation is to avoid making unacceptable concessions. One's
BATNA becomes one's walking away point, the bottom line.73 Susskind and Cruikshank
provide guidelines for public officials, citizens, and business interests to analyze prospects
and develop strategies when each of these groups is considering participation in a public
dispute negotiation.
70Douglas j. Amy, The Politics of Environmental Mediation, Columbia University Press, 1987.
71 Amy, Op. Cit.72 Amy, Op. Cit. pp. 98-10 1. According to Amy, Atlantic-Richfield, Dow Chemical, U.S. Steel and Union
Carbide "have ... invested money in promoting environmental mediation."
7 Fisher and Ury (and Patton), p. 99-102. Fisher and Ury resist equation of a BATNA with a bottom line,
but the two are analogous.
74 Susskind and Cruikshank, pp. 193-223.
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In "Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation,"" Rose-
Ackerman criticizes negotiated rulemaking, and in particular the endorsement of
regulatory negotiation in the National Performance Review, chiefly on the basis that it is
not appropriate for all regulations and that regulation itself is not appropriate for
addressing all pollution problems. She argues that market-based incentives are more
widely applicable to solving pollution problems. The title of her piece and thrust of her
argument, I argue, suggest an unnecessary and unfortunate tension between negotiation
and other regulatory tools. Far from arguing that negotiated rulemaking in the only
answer, proponents stress the need to assess the rule under consideration to ensure that
negotiation is appropriate for it.
While maintaining that regulators should apply market incentives to control pollution,
Rose-Ackerman does not explain how the agency will determine the ultimate regulatory
goal of the market manipulation or decide the degree to which market should be
manipulated, should the issue be contested. Equating a negotiated public policy dialogue
with an interview of consumers about their preferences, 6 she accepts the notion that
people behave and think the same as public citizens and as private consumers, a view that
many find debatable and unacceptable, as noted in the first chapter. She makes a valid
point that "the choice between regulatory negotiation and incentive systems should depend
on the nature of the regulatory task."7 7 I believe it is a point that few advocates of
regulatory negotiation would contest.
Amy and Rose-Ackerman and other commenters who question the usefulness,
applicability and possible unintended consequences of negotiated rulemaking play a useful
role by re-emphasizing the need for agencies to seek the best approach for the situation,
and for all of us to pay attention. Like many things, negotiated rulemaking is susceptible
7 Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation,"
Duke Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 6, April 1994, pp.1206-1220.
76 Rose-Ackerman, p. 1219.
77 Rose-Ackerman, p. 1218.
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misuse and shoddy practice. Because it is a very public process, it is likely to be less
susceptible than some other approaches.
CONCLUSION
In practice, regulatory negotiations have, on the whole, met theoretical expectations.
Experience to date shows that a negotiated approach provides advantages over
conventional notice and comment rulemaking when used in appropriate circumstances.
The theoretical basis for negotiated rulemaking and guidelines for its use developed at the
federal level have been demonstrated to be appropriate for state levle reg-negs. Although
most experience with the process so far has been at the federal level, there is no reason
state agencies should not avail themselves of this important regulatory tool.
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5. CONCLUSION: A TOOL FOR STATE AGENCIES
Negotiated rulemaking is, as McGarity stated, a tool that every regulatory agency should
have in its toolbox.' It offers a means to resolve some of the difficult regulatory problems
faced by state and federal environmental agencies. The three state cases demonstrate that
the process works in a range of settings at the state level, and despite shortcomings in the
execution of the process in some cases, enabled participants to produce regulations that
were acceptable to affected interests. Negotiated rulemaking provides a forum, missing
from the traditional notice and comment process, to bring different interests together in a
non-adversarial setting for the purpose of shaping a regulation that will work. The
process provides the agency and affected interests an opportunity to consider and deal
with the persistent and debatable issues that are at the heart of many regulatory disputes--
issues relating to the costs, distributional impacts, and uncertainty of the scientific or
technological basis of a proposed regulation. A summary of findings and
recommendations follows.
Negotiated rulemaking, when used in appropriate circumstances, can be a better
vehicle than the traditional process for resolving the common, contentious issues
identified in the first chapter.
If the conflict assessment has been done appropriately, the significantly affected interests
should be represented in the talks. If the facilitator is doing her job, the representatives
will have the opportunity to participate meaningfully. Thus, the process serves a
commonly accepted notion of fairness, that parties to a conflict have an opportunity to
participate meaningfully in decisions that affect them.2 In Maine, the conflict assessment
produced a 61-member negotiating group, yet this very large group was able to agree on a
structure that allowed it to function effectively and members to participate meaningfully.
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1 McGarity, Op. Cit., p. 1440.
2 Sturm, pp. 1391-1392; Albin, p. 226.
The nonadversarial nature of the forum does not dissolve the differences that exist
between interest groups, and does not mean the participants will not, or should not,
actively be pursuing their interests. It does mean that the focus of the group's energies
will be on attacking the problem, that is, producing a regulation that all parties can accept,
rather than expending needless time and resources on undermining the positions of the
agency or other affected interests.
Having affected interests together in a nonadversarial setting improves the likelihood of
getting pertinent information from the participants and a better sense than the agency
would likely have on its own of their priorities, concerns, and perspectives on issues of
costs and the distributional impacts of a proposed regulation. At the same time, it affords
the opportunity for participants to scrutinize data and uncover and debate the legitimacy
of underlying assumptions, consistent with Sturm's observation that "participation serves
the instrumental value of enhancing the prospect of a reasoned and accurate decision."3
The facilitator helps keep negotiators on track, focused on the problem and moving
forward. In each of the state cases described earlier, information sharing was a critical
element. And the facilitators in each case were critical to the success of the talks. One of
the Texas negotiators, for example, reckoned that without the assistance of the facilitator,
talks would have become "hopelessly mired."
The challenges of state environmental agencies are on a par with those of their federal
counterpart, in terms of complexity and contentiousness. As the EPA has found
regulatory negotiations to be a useful tool and an improvement over traditional
process, more state agencies probably would, too, if they tried it. State agencies may
have less incentive to innovate, however.
As the Title 5 case in Massachusetts shows, state environmental agencies can face
extremely complex and contentious regulatory challenges. And, as the three state cases
show, regulatory negotiations can produce an acceptable outcome in cases where the
3 Susan Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies," The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 79
(1991), p. 1392.
shape of an acceptable rule was not apparent to the agency working alone. According to
the ACUS, however, regulations of state agencies are litigated less frequently than federal
regulations, because of the existence of safeguards such as oversight committees and
because disaffected interests are more likely to appeal to the legislature or governor for
redress than to challenge the agency in court.4 With fewer court challenges to face, state
agencies may be less motivated to seek alternatives to the traditional notice and comment
procedures than the EPA was, with 80 percent of its regulations being challenged in
court,' when it first tried negotiated rulemaking in 1984.
In addition, according to the ACUS, some state agencies have informally consulted with
affected stakeholders to build consensus for proposed agency actions since the turn of the
6century. It could be that such processes are relatively effective in identifying points of
controversy in many cases, so that agencies see less need to undertake or even consider a
full blown negotiated rulemaking process.
While some states do have negotiated rulemaking laws, such laws are not needed to
use the process. Moreover, simply having a law on the books may not do much to
encourage agencies to actually try it. Nevertheless, a state statute, as with the federal
law, can provide guidance to agencies in determining whether the process is
appropriate for the rule under consideration, procedures for conducting a reg-neg, and
how the reg-neg process relates to the state's administrative procedures requirements.
As noted, the three states whose cases are reviewed in chapter 3 did not have any laws
pertaining specifically to negotiated rulemaking. As I started to look for examples of state
agencies that had used the process, I contacted several states with negotiated rulemaking
statutes, but was not able to identify examples of its actual use in those states. As noted in
the introduction, I specifically sought examples of the process in which a neutral fahcilitator
4 Sourcebook, p. 369.
5 "An Assessment of EPA's Negotiated Rulemaking Activities," EPA Program Evaluation Division,
Office of Management Systems and Evaluation, and Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation; December
1987. Reprinted in Sourcebook (1995).
6 Sourcebook, p. 369.
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conducted the meetings and the agency participated as one of the negotiators; a final rule
also had to have been promulgated. (Although these procedural stipulations fit the
definition of the process advocated by many practitioners and the ACUS, and are
considered part of the definition of negotiated rulemaking described here, some state
statutes have framed the term more generally to include a range of negotiated or
consultative procedures involving stakeholders.) My failure to find examples in states
with a reg-neg statute may have been due to the absence of a central clearinghouse for
such information. In Nebraska, for example, the office of the senator who had sponsored
the state's 1994 reg-neg law was unaware of actual use of the procedure7 and the legal
counsel for the state Department of Environmental Quality, who had testified in support of
the reg-neg bill, said that his agency had not formally conducted a negotiated rulemaking.
Leads to several other Nebraska agencies also proved fruitless.
The Montana Consensus Council provided a case summary of a negotiated resolution to a
public lands dispute. However, according to the summary, state agencies did not
participate directly in negotiations, but, rather, were presented with a proposal developed
through negotiations of the private interests in the dispute.9 Accordingly, this case did not
meet the criteria I had established for examples.
New York's Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) conducted a negotiated
rulemaking that had the elements I sought except that it had not been promulgated.
Without that critical step it was impossible to judge whether stakeholder concerns had
been adequately addressed by the negotiating committee. The DEC had undertaken the
negotiations, on regulations of dry cleaners that use the chemical perchloroethylene,
7 Personal communication, Laurel March, office of Senator David Landis, March 1996. According to
March, the Department of Social Services had received a petition to conduct a negotiated rulemaking,
according to provisions in the Nebraska law. In response, the department agreed to hold informal,
informational hearings. Apparently the petitioner did not pursue a request for a more comprehensive
process (memo from Laurel March to author, March 7, 1996).
8 Mike Linder, Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality, personal communication, April 8, 1996;
and Hearing Testimony on LB 1043, Committee on Government, Military, and Veterans Affairs, February
2, 1994.
9 "Recreational Access to State School Trust Lands in Montana: A Case Study in Collaborative Problem
Solving," a Transboundary Initiative Working Paper for Public Comment, October 1994.
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pursuant to an executive order issued by Governor Cuomo in 1992. The executive order
is modeled after the federal negotiated rulemaking act and, in addition, directs the DEC to
negotiate a rule pertaining to air quality as well as one other rule, as demonstrations.'"
After receiving training at RESOLVE's Center for Environmental Dispute Resolution in
Washington, DC, a member of the DEC staff from outside the air quality program office
served as convener and facilitator. The facilitator's evaluation of the process (which also
was mandated by the executive order) provides a good deal of insight into the process."
Unfortunately, before the draft rule was formerly proposed, in January 1995, New York
got a new governor, who issued a moratorium on all new regulations. Although the
moratorium has since expired, some other procedural deadlines have passed, and as of
October 1996 the draft rule had not been published as a proposed rule. The facilitator
believes the negotiations went well and produced a viable rule, but is uncertain as to how
some stakeholders may respond once the rule is finally proposed, because of the long time
that has elapsed."
I contacted several other states with negotiated rulemaking statutes, but, as noted in the
introduction, the first three cases I identified that met my criteria were in states without
reg-neg laws; and my search stopped there.
Barriers to use of the process by state agencies include doubts that the rule in question
warrants a significant deviation from usual procedures; general lack offamiliarity
with the process or even its existence; concerns about costs of the undertaking;
concerns about the potential complexity and uncertainty of the process, including
potential loss of control over the process and relinquishment of legal authority.
1* Executive Order 156, signed by Governor Mario M. Cuomo, June 8, 1992.
" "Report of the Negotiated Rule Making Committee for 6 NYCRR Part 232 - Dry Cleaning Facilities
That Use Perchloroethylene," submitted to the Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation and to the Director of the New York State Office for Regulatory and
Management Assistance, January 1995.
12 Lenore Kuwik, DEC Division of Regulatory Services, personal communication, March 28, 1996 and
October, 22, 1996.
114
Resistance to using negotiated rulemaking probably stems from some combination of
these factors.
In two of the state cases, Maine and Ohio, the agencies faced a combination of being
extremely challenged by the rule writing task in front of them and coincidentally hearing
the suggestion of negotiated rulemaking from a source that merited their attention. Just
being stymied was not enough. The Ohio DEP extended its public comment period for
about a year, pondering what to do, when it heard through the department's legal staff
about the Ohio Commission's dispute resolution demonstration project. The dispute
resolution demonstration project not only presented the idea of a negotiated approach to
resolving the widely disparate views expressed in comment letters, but also offered the
prospect of technical assistance in organizing it and funds to help defray costs. The
Commissioner of MIDOT was committed to trying to bring formerly warring parties
together again after the bitter referendum campaign, and presumably had questions about
the task of writing a rule his agency had vigorously opposed. Meanwhile, the idea of
negotiated rulemaking had gotten some positive play in at least one editorial, and a
coalition of referendum backers suggested it. Still, the department had concerns about
loss of control over the process and outcome, which were alleviated by a conference call
between agency staff and Philip Harter. Just to be sure, the commissioner reasserted his
agency's authority when the negotiating group was convened, stressing that any rule
would have to be deemed workable by his agency. Considering the reconciliation task he
saw in front of him the commissioner probably was less concerned about costs than the
other agencies, once he accepted the process could work.
In Texas, the representative of the Texas General Land Office (GLO), Ingrid Hansen, was'
concerned about having a process that was as transparent as possible, with the resulting
legitimacy the transparency could confer. She knew of a negotiated rulemaking conducted
by the Coast Guard to develop an oil spill response plan, and believed that the process
would work for developing the damage assessment protocols." Hansen was involved in
the legislative negotiations that produced the amendments to the state's Oil Spill
13 Ingrid Hansen, personal communication, April 26, 1996.
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Prevention and Response Act, and made the suggestion in the course of those talks. The
suggestion was supported by the GLO legal counsel and not opposed by any other parties,
and did not receive much attention. As a result of her suggestion, the OSPRA
amendments included a stipulation that the damage assessment protocols be developed
using negotiated rulemaking.1 4 The cost of conducting the negotiated rulemaking was of
some concern to the GLO, which as lead agency sponsored the negotiations, but of
greater concern was the costs to nonprofit organizations to participate. The GLO
managed to provide some travel costs for the representatives of the two Galveston Bay
organizations. For future negotiated rulemaking endeavors, Hansen thinks it is critical to
have a resource pool to assist nonprofits with the costs of participation.
State experiences reconfirm the central importance of the convening process and role
of the neutral facilitator.
Negotiated rulemaking derives legitimacy and instrumental value from the meaningful
participation of affected interests. Identification of affected interests during the convening
process is thus critical to the success of the negotiation. Conveners need to recognize that
some interests will be less visible and less organized than others and that identifying these
groups is a key challenge. In some cases, anyway, the views of the better-organized
interests are by definition more likely already to be known by the agency.
As others have advocated and the federal law required, agencies should publish an
announcement of the intention to convene a negotiated rulemaking committee to enhance
the prospects that all key interests will be identified. Also, because less organized interests
are less likely to review the state register of agency actions, the agency should consider
publishing the announcement in a newspaper of general circulation and trade publications,
as appropriate. The negotiating committee needs to stay open to the possibility that
interest groups may come forward and request to participate after negotiations are
underway.
"4 Letter from Ingrid Hansen to author; April 26, 1996.
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Having a skilled neutral facilitator, or a team of neutrals, was key in the state cases to
keeping talks moving forward. As predicted by theory and previous experience, the
facilitators kept negotiators focused on the problem, rather than on the agency or each
other.
How the Title 5 revisions may have turned out had DEP undertaken a negotiated
rulemaking process is, of course, impossible to say. Negotiations are always fluid and
dynamic, and as participants have observed, outcomes are difficult to predict.
However, negotiated rulemaking is designed to address some of the difficulties the
agency faced, and a number of elements of negotiated rulemaking would probably
have proven beneficial
A comprehensive, statewide conflict assessment would have helped identify a broader
range of affected interests, including some of the stakeholders who emerged late in the
process with newly articulated concerns and objections. The existing advisory committee
consisted of many of the same individuals and constituent organizations that had served on
advisory committees in 1978, during the previous revision of the environmental code, and
that had reviewed drafts of the consultant's technical report for the most recent revisions.
The agency would likely have benefited from the input of additional perspectives early on,
to get a more comprehensive understanding of the impacts and perceptions of the
proposed revisions.
A shift in focus away from lobbying or attacking the agency and toward attacking the
problem of pollution caused by onsite septic systems would have been a more productive
expenditure of interest group energies. Organizations represented on the department's
advisory committee were among it most vocal critics. It is not apparent that some interest
groups felt any sense of responsibility for developing a code that would be mutually
acceptable.
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A negotiating committee could have undertaken joint fact finding to resolve disputed
points of science and technology. With the agency as a participant, the agency's technical
staff could have participated directly in support of the agency's interests, rather than as
referee (and target).
The issue of unorganized interests presents an obvious problem in this case. Private
property owners who have onsite sewage disposal systems are not organized as such, and
some of their concerns did not surface in a dramatic way until after the revised code took
effect. The representation of missing or unorganized interest on a committee may not be
an insurmountable problem, but it certainly would pose a challenge.
CONCLUSION
Harter concluded his comprehensive 1982 analysis of the value of negotiated rulemaking
with the modest suggestion that it was "worth a try." Since then it has proven to be well
worth trying and using, a valuable approach to regulations when used appropriately.
Criticism of the process stems in part from the potential for it to be used in the wrong
circumstances, as when fundamental values or rights are at stake, and in part because it
does not offer a solution to all regulatory problems. The ad hoc nature of the conflict
assessment and convening portion of the process will remain susceptible to missteps and
oversights, so that attention and diligence will always be critical at the outset of a reg-neg.
The openness of the process provides for self-correction of such oversights, though, as
previously unidentified interests have the opportunity to hear about a rulemaking endeavor
and come forward to participate.
The fact that negotiated rulemaking is not the only tool or even the main tool in the
toolbox is not a legitimate criticism of its high value in certain regulatory contexts. In his
discussion of the challenges of regulatory reform, Stewart warned against expecting or
accepting "simplistic remedies."" This includes, I believe, expecting to discover or
develop any all-purpose approach to regulation. The challenge for those who believe the
118
" Stewart (1975), p. 1813.
process can benefit the quality of regulatory decision making, when used appropriately, is
to make more agencies aware of its potential benefits so that, even if they do not make use
of it often, they think of it when the appropriate, contentious situation arises, and know
where to turn for more information.
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